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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1948 Genocide Convention represents the most significant treaty
in international criminal law to address massive human rights abuses.
However, international law has also developed an elaborate body of law
outside the treaty process that addresses a broad range of systematic
atrocities. This corpus, known as "crimes against humanity," remains
primarily a product of customary international law, and thus its elaboration
involves a different intellectual task from that in comprehending the
Genocide Convention and other treaties.1
A definition of "crimes against humanity" as a label for a category of
international crimes was first articulated in the Nuremberg Charter in
1945,2 with a similar definition appearing shortly thereafter in the Tokyo
Charter,3 and with further modifications in Allied Control Council Law
No. 10.4 Subsequent efforts at codification were not successful, 5 although
international instruments relating to specific aspects of "crimes against
humanity" were adopted,6 and national prosecutions resulted in a small
body of helpful case law.7 A recent development was the adoption of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court8 which elaborates
1. STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INT'L LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 45 (1997).
2. Charter of the Int'l Military Trib., annexed to Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art.
6(c), 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
3. Charter of the Int'l Military Trib. for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, art. 5(c),
T.I.A.S. No. 1589, reprinted in 1 BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INT'L AGGRESSION
522, 523 (1975) [hereinafter Tokyo Charter].
4. Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and
Against Humanity, Allied Control Council Law No. 10, December 20, 1945, Official
Gazette of The Control Council for Germany, No. 3 (1946), reprinted in M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 590 (1992)
[hereinafter CCL No. 10].
5. For further details see the present study Section II (c), The ILC and the
Codification of "Crimes Against Humanity."
6. See Statute of the Int'l Criminal Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N.S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), amended
by U.N.S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3878th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166
(1998) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; see also Statute of the Int'l Criminal Trib. for
Rwanda, U.N.S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453th mtg., at art. 3, U.N Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
7. See Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, (Can. S.Ct. 1968);
Regina v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701; Fdd6ration Nationale des D6portes et Internes
R6sistants et Patriotes v. Barbie, 78 I.L.R. 125 (Cass. Crim. [France] 1985).
8. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (1998).
the definition of this offence, 9 and precisely determines its elements.10
The absence of a specialized convention for "crimes against humanity,"
and its consideration as a category of international crimes whose specific
contents consist of a number of crimes contained in the laws of most
national legal systems, required an exhaustive study to distinguish such a
category of crimes from "ordinary" municipal crimes (i.e., murder,
assault, torture, etc.).
The purpose of this study is to examine the past and present contours
of the prohibition of "crimes against humanity", analyzing and scrutinizing
the essential elements of this crime, with a view to obtaining and drawing
together basic criteria that could eventually guide the adjudication of this
offence. Furthermore, this clarification of "crimes against humanity" is
particularly timely with respect to the soon functioning International
Criminal Court (ICC).
Since the evolution of "crimes against humanity" also contains significant
developments regarding the enumerated acts of which it is comprised,
this study will focus on one enumerated act that is of particular interest
and deserves more detailed comment, the crime of persecution. Because
the contemporary status of "crimes against humanity" under international
law cannot be understood or appreciated without reference to its history,
and since the existence of a new crime under customary international
law would require a painstaking review of State practice and elements of
opinio juris, the first part of this study will trace the evolution of the
legal prohibition of "crimes against humanity." This first part provides
an overview of the definitions of "crimes against humanity" prior to and
post World War II; the codification of this offense by the International
Law Commission (ILC); its formulation in the Statutes of the two ad hoc
Tribunals; and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Part two deals with the general requirements that elevate a crime
under ordinary criminal law to a "crime against humanity". This second
part examines and analyzes the general requirements of "crimes against
humanity" as set out in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, the Statutes
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the
ICC through the case law of the International and National Tribunals.
9. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 183/9 (1998), available at http://www.un.org/1aw/icc/index.htm.
For instance, the definition does not require any nexus to armed conflict, does not
require proof of a discriminatory motive, and recognizes the crime of apartheid and
enforced disappearance as inhumane acts.
10. Finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Preparatory Comm'n for
the Int'l Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/I/Add.2 (2000), available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/commissn.htm.
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Part three is an attempt to resolve the incoherence regarding the
definition of the actus reus and the mens rea of the crime of persecution
through the case law of the International Tribunals. Finally, the conclusion
brings together the main points raised throughout the essay and highlights
the controversial issues of "crimes against humanity" as contained in the
Rome Statute.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE LEGAL PROHIBITION OF "CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY"
A. Developments Prior to and During the World War H
The concept of "crimes against humanity" traces its origins to the
preamble of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 concerning the Law
and Customs of War on Land,' 1 an instrument concerned with war crimes in
the technical and narrow sense. The Convention recalls in paragraph
two of the preamble that the Contracting Parties are "animated by the
desire to serve," even in the case of war, "the interests of humanity and
the ever-progressive needs of civilization." The so-called "Martens Clause,"
'1 2
which can be found in the above Hague Convention and subsequent
humanitarian law conventions, "first articulated the notion that international
law encompassed transcendental humanitarian principles that existed
beyond conventional law."'13 This clause provides that:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high
contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under
the protection and the rule of the principles of the laws of nations, as they result
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity
and the dictates of the public conscience. 
14
The specific origin of the term "crimes against humanity" as the label
for a category of international crimes can be traced to May 28, 1915,
when the governments of France, Great Britain, and Russia issued a joint
declaration denouncing the Ottoman government's massacre of the
11. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the
Convention Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, [hereinafter Hague IV], reprinted in BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 638.
12. The Martens Clause is named after Fyodor Martens, the Russian diplomat and
jurist who drafted it at the first Hague Conference to address the laws of war.
13. Beth Van Schaak, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the
Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNA'L L., 787, 795-97 (1999).
14. Hague IV, supra note I I (emphasis added).
Armenian population in Turkey as constituting "crimes against civilization
and humanity" for which all members of the Turkish government would
be held responsible together with its agents implicated in the massacres."'
15
The relevant part of this declaration reads as follows:
En presence de ces nouveaux crimes de la Turquie contre I'humanitd et la
civilisation, les Gouvernements allis font savoir publiquement 5 la Sublime
Porte qu'ils tiendront personnellement responsables des dits crimes tous les
membres du Gouvernement ottoman ainsi qu 6 ceux de ses agents qui se
trouveraient impliqu6s dans de pareils massacres.
However, the treaty of Versailles (1919) did not include such a crime. It
contained provisions only for prosecuting German military personnel for
war crimes (Article 228)."
In January 1919 the Preliminary Conference decided to create a
Commission of Fifteen Members for the purpose of inquiring into the
responsibilities relating to the war. The Commission was instructed, inter
alia, to inquire into and to report upon "the facts as to breaches of the
laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire
and their Allies, on land, on sea, and on the air during the 1914-1919
war."'18 The Report, dated 29 March 1919, stated in Chapter II: "in spite
of the explicit regulations, of established customs, and of the clear
dictates of humanity, Germany and her allies have piled outrage upon
outrage." 9 The majority of the Commission came to the conclusion that
the First World War "was carried on by the Central Empires together
with their allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, by barbarous or illegitimate
methods in violation of the established laws and customs of war and the
elementary laws of humanity," and that "all persons belonging to enemy
countries . .. who have been guilty of offences against the laws and
customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal
,,20prosecution.
In 1920, Turkey agreed in the Treaty of Sevres to bring to justice
15. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 62 (2d rev. ed., 1999).
16. La Documentation Internationale, La Paix de Versailles, Vol. 3, Responsibilities
des auteurs de la Guerre et Sanctions," Paris, 1930, Annex I to the main report, quoted
in U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR, 35 (1948). See also
BASSIOUNI, supra note 15.
17. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany,
Versailles, June 28, 1919, reprinted in BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 551-52.
18. Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. YEAR BOOK OF INT'L L.
179, 180-81 (1946).
19. Id.
20. Id. It is, however, not clear whether the 1919 Commission, in using the term
"crimes against the law of humanity," had in mind offences which were not covered by
the other expression "violation of the laws and customs of war."
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those responsible for the massacres against Armenians. 21  The Allies
who joined that Treaty insisted that language imposing liability for
"crimes against humanity" be included.22 Although the Treaty of Sevres
envisioned the prosecution of those responsible for the massacres, the
Allies never designated a tribunal to try the accused. Nor did the League
23of Nations create a tribunal competent to deal with the massacres.
Unfortunately, the Treaty of Sevres was never ratified and it never
came into force.24 It was replaced by the treaty of Lausanne, which not
only failed to include provisions for the prosecution of Turkish nationals
for these "crimes against civilization and humanity," but was also
accompanied by a "Declaration of Amnesty" for all offences committed
between 1914-1922, which were obviously connected with political
decisions.25
Interestingly, Egon Schwelb, legal officer for the United Nations War
Crimes Commission has observed that the distinction made in 1919-
between violations of the laws and customs of war on the one hand, and
offences against the laws of humanity on the other--corresponds roughly to
the two categories of "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity" as
they are set out in Article 6(b) and (c) of the Nuremberg Charter.26
Another development took place in 1943-1944 when the London
International Assembly 27 recommended that in defining the scope of the
retributive action of the Allies, 'a comprehensive view should be taken
including not only the customary violations of the laws of war ... but
any other serious crime against the local law, committed in time of war,
the perpetrator of which has not been visited by appropriate
punishment'.28
21. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey, 15 AM. J. OF INT'L L.
179, 235 (Supp. 1921). See also Schwelb, supra note 18, at 182.
22. Schwelb, supra note 18, at 181-82.
23. David Matas, Prosecuting Crimes Against Humanity: The Lessons of World
War 1, 13 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 86, 91 (1989-1990).
24. Schwelb, supra note 18, at 182.
25. See Treaty of Peace Between the Allied powers and Turkey (Treaty of
Lausanne), July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. II, 18 AM. J. INT'LL. I (Supp. 1924).
26. Schwelb, supra note 18, at 181-83.
27. The London International Assembly (LIA), an unofficial body comprised of
distinguished jurists representing, in an unofficial capacity the view of the European
Allies. It was established during the Second World War by an unofficial body, the
League of Nations Union.
28. The Punishment of War Criminals: -Recommendations of the London
International Assembly (Report of Commission 1), reprinted in BASSIOUNI, supra note 4,
at 562. See also Schwelb, supra note 18, at 184.
In October 1943, it proposed the establishment of an international
criminal court whose jurisdiction was to encompass "crimes in respect of
which no national court had jurisdiction." This category was meant to
,,29include offences subsequently described as "crimes against humanity.
The unprecedented record of crimes by the Nazi regime led the United
Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC),30 an inter-governmental
agency established in 1943, to recommend "to the Allied Governments
that the retributive action of the United Nations should not be restricted
to what was traditionally considered as war crimes in the technical sense,
namely, a violation of the laws and customs of war." 31
Finally, Article 29 of the Instrument of Surrender of Italy foreshadowed
an extension of the retributive action of the Allies beyond the perpetrators of
"war crimes. 32 In other words, it foreshadowed the Charter's codification
of "crimes against humanity" by imposing on Italy the obligation to
apprehend into the hands of the United Nations not only persons
suspected of having committed "war crimes," but also persons suspected
of "analogous offences," an expression roughly indicating what have
become known as "crimes against humanity.
B. "Crimes Against Humanity" under the Nuremberg Charter, Tokyo
Charter and Control Council Law No. 10
On August 8, 1945 the four major Allied powers in World War II
ratified the London Agreement. 34 Appended to that agreement was the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of the Major
War Criminals, which marked the birth of the modern notion of "crimes
against humanity. 35 Article 6 of the Charter identified the crimes committed
in the European theatre as "crimes against peace," "war crimes," and
"crimes against humanity." In Article 6(c), the Charter defined this last
criminal category as:
29. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (2000). For the
drafting history of "crimes against humanity" see id. at 30-37.
30. History of the U..N. War Crimes Comm'n and the Development of the Laws of
War complied by the U.N. War Crimes Comm'n (1948) [hereinafter UNWCC], reprinted
in BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 570.
31. Schwelb, supra note 18, at 184-85.
32. Armistice With Italy: Instrument of Surrender, Sept. 29, 1943, 61 Stat. 2742,
T.I.A.S No. 1604, at para. 29. See also Schwelb, supra note 18, at 184-85.
33. Schwelb, supra note 18, at 185.
34. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S 279, E.A.S. No. 472,
reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (Supp. 1945), and in BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at
579-81.
35. Tokyo Charter, supra note 3.
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murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, hether or not
in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
As observed by the International Law Commission, Article 6(c) contained
two types of crimes against humanity, "murder. . . and other inhumane
acts" and "persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds. 37 This
categorization makes it clear that the ILC viewed the phrase "on
political, racial or religious grounds" as clarifying the basis of persecution,
rather than imposing a requirement of discriminatory motive for inhuman
acts.38
On October 6, 1945 the four governments signatory to the London
Agreement drew up a Protocol in Berlin to conform the French and
English texts of Article 6(c) to the Russian. 39 It is to be noted that the
London Agreement was executed in triplicate, in English, French, and
Russian, each text to have equal authenticity (Art. 7 of the Charter). The
discrepancy which was found to exist was this: in the English and the
French texts, Article 6(c) was divided into two parts by a semicolon
between the words "war" and "or persecutions." However, in the Russian
text, "which was equally authentic, there was no semicolon dividing the
paragraph, but a comma had been placed between what corresponds to
the words 'war' and 'or persecutions' in Russian. 40 Yet, it is beyond
any doubt that the qualification "in execution of or in connection with
any crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal" applies to the whole
context of the paragraph and constitutes a very important restriction on
the scope of the concept of "crimes against humanity. 41
36. Id.
37. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N.GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp.
No. 12, at para. 120, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950).
38. Phyllis Hwang, Defining Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 457, 462-63 (1998). It should be
noted that the 1949 Memorandum of the Secretary-General on the Charter and Judgment
of the Nuremberg Tribunal supported the interpretation by the ILC in such matters. The
Memorandum states that it could be argued that the phrase "on political, racial or
religious grounds" refers not only to persecutions but also to the first type of crimes
against humanity. The British Chief Prosecutor possibly held that opinion as he spoke of
"murder, extermination, enslavement, persecution on political racial or religious grounds."
39. Protocol to Agreement and Charter, London, 6 October 1945, reprinted in
BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 585-86.
40. Schwelb, supra note 18, at 188.
41. BASSIOUNI, supra note 15 at 27-31.
Moreover, it is to be noted that the change from the semicolon to the
comma was intended to strengthen the link between "crimes against
humanity" and "crimes against peace" particularly with war crimes, in
order to avoid the criticism that Article 6(c) was entirely new to international
law.42 It was further pointed out that the consequence of limiting the
scope of Article 6(c) was the exclusion of all Nazi crimes against the
Jews before 1939.
43
Following the example of Article 6(c) of the Statute of the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the Tokyo Charter incorporated this
same category of crimes in Article 5(c) of its Charter. 44 The Tokyo
Charter did not provide any further guidance on "crimes against humanity"
because it primarily prosecuted "crimes against peace. 45 The Tokyo
Charter narrowed the definition by omitting religious persecution. That
was probably due to the fact that the draftsmen assumed that persecutions
on religious grounds had actually not been committed on a large scale in
comparison with Japanese aggression and warfare.
It is worth noting that the Allied Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL
No. 10) governed the prosecution of war criminals within each of the
Allied occupation zones in Germany.46 The definition of "crimes against
humanity" in Article 11(c) of CCL No. 10 does not contain the words "in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal." Article I (c) removed the requirements of a connection with
either "crimes against peace" or "war crimes.' Thus, under CCL No.
10 formulation, "crimes against humanity" stood as a separate category
of international crimes, unrelated to the initiation and conduct of war or
to the commission of acts falling within the definition of "war crimes."
42. Id. at 29.
43. Id. at 30.
44. Tokyo Charter, supra note 3. Article 5(c) of the Tokyo Charter states:
Crimes Against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed before or during the war, or
persecutions on political or racial grounds in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or in violation
of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. Leaders organizers,
instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a
common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are
responsible for all acts performed by any person in execution of such plan.
45. Although both Tribunals were to try only major war criminals, the IMT was
established pursuant to an international treaty while the IMTFE was proclaimed in a
military order issued by General Douglas MacArthur, supreme commander of Allied
forces in the Pacific.
46. CCL No. 10, supra note 4.
47. Id. Article 11 (c) of CCL No. 10 defines "crimes against humanity" as follows:
"Atrocities and offences, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any
civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or
not in violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated."
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From the above, it is clear that Article H(c) of CCL No. 10 differs from
Articles 6(c) and 5(c) respectively of the London and Tokyo Charters.
These differences are: headings for Article II (c) defining "crimes
against humanity" as "Atrocities and Offences"; inclusion of the overly
broad terms, "included but not limited to"; the addition of the terms
"imprisonment" and "rape" although both are subsumed within the
words "or other inhumane acts" contained in all three texts; and the
removal of any connection between the specific crimes listed in Article
11 (c) and "crimes against peace" or "war crimes." This formulation was
later followed by the International Law Commission in its 1950
restatement of the "Nuremberg Principles. 48
C. The ILC and the Codification of "Crimes Against Humanity"
In 1947, the United Nations General Assembly created the International
Law Commission (ILC) as a permanent body having as its object "the
promotion of the progressive development of international law and its
codification., 49 On the same day, the U.N. General Assembly adopted
another resolution in which it decided "to entrust the formulation of the
principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal to the ILC."5 °
At its second session in 1950 the ILC completed its formulation of the
Nuremberg Principles. Principle VI(c) formulates "crimes against humanity"
as follows:
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done
against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in
execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime.5 1
Notably, the omission of the phrase "before or during war" used in
Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter was due to the ILC's view that it
48. International Law Commission Report on the Principles of the Nuremberg
Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12 at 11, U.N. Doc. A/I316 (1950), reprinted in
BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 624-26.
49. G.A. Res. 174 (II), U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 123rd plen. mtg., art. 1 at 105, U.N.
Doc A/519 (1947).
50. G.A. Res. 177 (II), U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 123rd plen. mtg., at 111, U.N. Doc
A/519 (1947). See LYAL S. SUNGA, THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: DEVELOPMENTS IN CODIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 8-9 (1997).
51. D.H.N. Johnson, The Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, 4 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 445, 449-50 (1955).
only referred to "a particular war, the war of 1939. ''52 Moreover, the ILC
developed several formulations for "crimes against humanity" during its
work on what was first called the "Draft Code of Offences Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind," which was subsequently renamed in
1987 by the ILC as the "Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind." These formulations occurred in 1954,
53 1991,14
and 1996.55 Following the submission, of the 1954 Draft Code, further
discussion on this work was suspended for several decades because the
"Cold War" had made the entire exercise highly controversial.56
52. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp.
No. 12, at para. 123, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950).
53. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Draft
Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess.,
Supp. No. 9, ch. 3, art. 2, sec. 11, U.N. Doc. A/2691 (1954). Article 2 of the Draft Code
of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1954 Draft Code) states:
The following acts are offences against the peace and security of mankind:
Inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, or
persecutions, committed against any civilian population on social, political,
racial, religious, or cultural grounds by the authorities of a state or by private
individuals acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities.
54. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in Report of
the Int'l Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 46th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 265, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (July 19, 1991) [hereinafter Report of the
Int'l Law Comm'n]. Article 21 (Systematic or Mass Violation of Human Rights) states:
An individual who commits or orders the commission of any of the following
violations of human rights: murder; torture; establishing or maintaining over
persons a status of slavery, servitude or forced labour; persecution on social,
political, racial, religious or cultural grounds, in a systematic manner or on a
mass scale; or deportation or forcible transfer of population shall, on
conviction thereof, be sentenced ....
55. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N.
GAOR. 48th Sess., at 6-7, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532 (July 8, 1996). Article 18 of the
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996 Draft Code)
states that:
A crime against humanity means any of the following acts, when committed in
a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed by a





e) persecution on political, racial, religious or ethnic grounds;
f) institutionalized discrimination on racial, ethnic or religious grounds
involving the violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms and
resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part of the population;
g) arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population;
h) forced disappearance of persons;
i) rape, enforced prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse;
j) other inhumane acts which severely damage physical or mental
integrity, health or human dignity, such as mutilation and severe bodily
harm.
56. See Report of the Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note 54.
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Almost fifty years ago, the 1954 Draft Code of Offences was criticized by
D.H.N. Johnson, in particular Article 2 of the Code which consists of an
amended version of Nuremberg Principle VI(c).5 7 He noted that "inhumane
acts" were linked to a requirement that they be committed on social,
cultural, political, racial, and religious grounds. However, under the
Nuremberg principles it was only persecution which was required to be
on "political, racial or religious grounds." 58 He added, with concern, "it
now seems that it is necessary to show that any of the "inhuman acts,"
including murder, extermination, enslavement and deportation, as well
as persecutions, were committed on "social, political, racial, religious or
cultural grounds. 59
Johnson also questioned the requirement of state involvement particularly
in the light of the Genocide Convention.60 Under the Genocide Convention,
individuals were responsible under any circumstances, while under the
Code an individual is responsible for "inhumane acts" only if it can be
shown that he committed these acts "at the instigation or with the
toleration" of the authorities of aState. To paraphrase Johnson's criticism,
individuals will be held legally responsible for crimes against humanity
only if a "state action or policy connection" exists.6 '
The 1991 Draft Code was also criticized by Prof. Bassiouni because of
the confusion between individual and State responsibility evident in
several aspects of that Code.62 Furthermore, the basis for State criminal
responsibility was not identified. He adds, "with respect to those offences
that are product of 'State action or policy,' the Draft Code of Crimes
failed to identify those international or jurisdictional elements that are
indispensable for distinguishing between conduct that is wholly within
the national criminal jurisdiction of a given State and conduct that
constitutes an international crime irrespective of national law."63
57. Johnson, supra note 51, at 465.
58. Id. For the redrafting of the 1954 Draft Code, see Doudou Thiam, Fourth
Report on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/398 (1986), reprinted in 2 Year Book of Int'l L.
Comm'n 53, 38th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1986/Add.1 (1986). Mr. Thiam's
1991 version was more specific and far more elaborate than the 1954 Draft Code.
59. Johnson, supra note 51, at 465.
60. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, U.N.
GAOR, 3rd Sess., Pt. I, at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in 45 AM. J. INT'L L.
7 (Supp. 1951).
61. Johnson, supra note 51, at 465.
62. BASSlOUNI, supra note 15, at 186.
63. Id. at 186-92. See also SUNGA, supra note 50, at 124-62.
Additionally, the text of Article 21 of the 1991 Draft Code is marred
by two obvious drafting errors.64 In the first place, the phrase "in a
systematic manner or on a mass scale" relates only to the crime of
persecution. However, as evidenced by the title of Article 21 and by its
subsequent presentation together with commentary, 65 one can discern
that the element of systematic or mass violation refers to all of the first
four offenses listed in Article 21.66
Secondly, the word "individual" as inserted in the chapeau of Article
21 of the 1991 Draft Code signifies that any individual, not only
government officials or State agents, may be held legally responsible for
crimes enumerated in Article 21. Consequently, a perpetrator may be
held criminally responsible within the purview of the Code even if he
commits murder or torture systematically, or on a mass scale on purely
private grounds which is a matter of domestic prosecution. This would
indeed contradict the current law of crimes against humanity.
The 1996 Draft Code required two "general conditions" for an act to
reach the level of a "crime against humanity." First, the act must be
committed in a "systematic manner or on a large scale." As clarified by
the ILC's Report,67 for an act to be systematic, it must be committed
"pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy. The implementation of this
plan or policy could result in the repeated or continuous commission of
inhumane acts.', 68 This requirement was imposed to distinguish between
the prosecution of a "random act" which falls under domestic prosecution,
and acts which constitute "crimes against humanity." On the other hand,
the term "large scale" referred to situations "involving a multiplicity of
victims, for example, as a result of the cumulative effect of a serious of
inhuman acts or the singular effect of an inhumane act of extraordinary
magnitude." 69 This requirement aimed to exclude any "isolated inhumane
act committed by a pe~etrator acting on his own initiative and direct
against a single victim." 0
The second condition required by the ILC was that crimes against
humanity be "instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization
64. Christian Tomuschat, Crimes Against the Peace and the Security of Mankind
and the Recalcitrant Third State, in WAR CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 41, 49-50
(Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1996).
65. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-third
Session, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 265, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991).
66. Id.
67. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth
session U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, ch. 2, art. 18, at para. 3, U.N. Doc.
A/51/10 (1996), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/1996/96repfra.htm.
68. Id.
69. Id. at para. 4.
70. Id.
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or group .... This definition would enable groups that exercise de facto
control over a territory, without official recognition as the legitimate
state authority, to be held responsible for crimes against humanity."'"
A further point that deserves particular mention is that Article 18 of
the 1996 Draft Code does not include as a requirement of crimes against
humanity that the prohibited acts be committed against a civilian population.
The Commentary to the Draft Code does not offer an explanation why
the victimization of a civilian population does not feature as an element
of the offense of "crimes against humanity." It might be held that the
1LC while adopting the 1996 Draft Code followed the Yugoslav
Tribunal in the Rule 61 Decision in the Vukovar case.72 In this decision
the Trial Chamber referred to the Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, which noted that while the
term "any civilian population" principally applies to non-combatants, it
does not necessarily exclude those "who at one particular point did bear
arms." If indeed this was the reasoning behind the ILC's decision to
remove any reference to civilian populations in Article 18, then it may
be considered a progressive development regarding the legal prohibition
of crimes against humanity.
Given the fact that the concept of "crimes against humanity" has been
developed by the ILC in 1954, 1991 and 1996, it is beyond any shadow
of doubt that the definition of "crimes against humanity" and the
identification of its elements have still not been fully resolved.
D. The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR: The Security
Council's Formulations
The two ad hoc Tribunals have contributed to developing and broadening
the notion of "crimes against humanity." One of the most significant
differences between the Statutes of the ICTY7 3 and the ICTR74 is that the
former requires proof of the existence of an armed conflict, while the75
latter does not. The requirement of an armed conflict in Article 5 of
71. HWANG, supra note 38, at 467.
72. Prosecutor v. Mile Msksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin SIjivancanin, (Case
No. IT-95-13-R 61) Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules and
Procedure and Evidence, April 3, 1996, at para. 29, quoted in Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-T,
Opinion and Judgment, at para. 643 (May 7, 1997) [hereinafter Vukovar Hospital
Decision].
73. See ICTY Statute, supra note 6, at art. 5.
74. See ICTR Statute, supra note 6, at art. 3.
75. ICTY Statute, supra note 6. Article 5 of the ICTY grants the International
the ICTY Statute is similar to that of Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg
Charter which limited the Nuremberg Tribunal's jurisdiction to "crimes
against humanity" committed "before or during the war," although the
latter was further limited by requiring that "crimes against humanity" be
committed "in execution of or in connection with war crimes or crimes
against peace. 76 However, in its Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, rendered in Tadic, the Appeals
Chamber elaborated on the fact that "crimes against humanity" may be
committed notwithstanding the absence of any connection with an armed
conflict. The Appeals Chamber states that:
Tribunal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes against humanity only "when committed in
armed conflict" whether of an international or internal character. Article 5 define crimes
against humanity as follows:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict,









(h)persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.
While Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTR defines crimes against humanity as follows:
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute
persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as a part of a
wide spread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national,








(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.
76. Id. It should be noted that Article 5 of the Statute of ICTY is modelled on
Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, but with several clarifications. The first is to
include rape as a specifically listed type of crime constituting a crime against humanity.
But since rape and sexual assaults fall within the meaning of "other inhumane acts," as
listed in Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter and Article 5(i) of the ICTY Statute, the
specific inclusion of rape in Article 5(g) does not alter, but clarify existing law. The
second clarification is the removal of the "war connection" required by Article 6(c) of
the Charter between acts constituting crimes against humanity and the initiation and
waging of an aggressive war (Article 6(a)) and war crimes (Article 6(b)). The basis of
that removal as stated by Prof. Bassiouni is the evolution of customary international law.
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It is by now a settled rule of customary international law that crimes against
humanity do not require a connection to international armed conflict. Indeed, as
the Prosecutor points out, customary international law may not require a
connection between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all. Thus, by
requiring that crimes against humanity be committed in either internal or
international armed conflict, the Security Council may have defined the crime in
Article 5 more narrowly than necessary under customary international
law .... 77
A second difference between the Statutes of the two ad hoc Tribunals
is that, unlike the ICTY Statute, the Rwanda Statute requires that "crimes
against humanity" be "committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial
or religious grounds. 78 This requirement seems to emphasize the policy
element.79 In other words, it is not the single killing that is targeted, but
mass killings, unless the single killing can be linked to a "systematic"
policy or to "widespread" attacks.8°
Although Article 5 of the ICTY Statute does not require that the acts
should be committed on a "widespread or systematic" basis in order to
constitute "crimes against humanity," the Yugoslav Tribunal has pointed
out in several decisions that the term "widespread or systematic" constitutes
an essential element of the notion of "crimes against humanity" under
the ICTY Statute. In the Opinion and Judgment rendered in Tadic, the
Trial Chamber held that: "It is now well established that the requirement
that the acts be directed against a civilian 'population' can be fulfilled if
the acts occur on either a widespread basis or in a systematic manner.
Either one of these is sufficient to exclude isolated or random acts."
8
'
"Crimes against humanity" as defined by the ICTY and ICTR Statutes
has influenced both the 1995 ad hoc Committee,82 and the 1996, 1997-
1998 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
77. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, at para. 141 (Oct. 2, 1995). For a legislative
history of Article 5 ICTY, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 538-54 (1996).
78. ICTR Statute, supra note 6, at art. 3.
79. For a discussion of the policy element as an element for "crimes against
humanity," see infra Section 3(E).
80. BASSIOUNI, supra note 15, at 193-99.
81. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94- I -T, Opinion and Judgment, at para. 644
(May 7, 1997).
82. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 16-17, U.N. Doc. A/50/22
(Sept. 6, 1995).
Criminal Court in the deliberations of these two bodies with respect to
the definition of "crimes against humanity" as it stands now in Article 7
of the Rome Statute.83 Thus, the creation of these Tribunals paved the
way for the development of a body of international jurisprudence on
"crimes against humanity," which assists and guides the delegations
assembled at the Rome Conference.
E. The ICC Statute: The Latest Development
Article 7 of the Rome Statute expands the specific crimes which
constitute "crimes against humanity" and adds much needed specification.
The chapeau of Article 7 of the ICC Statute reads as follows: "For the
purpose of this Statute, 'crimes against humanity' means any of the
following acts when committed as a part of widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with the knowledge of
the attack., 84 The phrase "attack directed against any civilian population" is
precisely determined under paragraph 2 of Article 7 as "a course of conduct
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1
against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State
or organizational policy to commit such attack.,
85
The structure of Article 7 is divided in two parts: the general elements
and the specific crimes. The general elements are intended to be the
international or jurisdictional elements needed to make this category of
crimes an international one. These general elements are defined as
"widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population." The
term "attack" and the subsequent international requirement that it be
"with knowledge" reflect the particular nature of the overall conduct that
leads to the commission of the specific crimes described in (a) to (k).86
The "acts" must be carried out in a "widespread or systematic" manner,
reflecting "the policy element." Lastly, there is the general requirement
that the attack as characterised by its "widespread or systematic" nature
and manner, must be directed against a "civilian population." It is
therefore the cumulative effect of these three general elements that
constitute the international or jurisdictional element that transforms the
specific crimes listed in (a) to (k) from domestic crimes to a category of
international crimes.87
83. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Volume II (Compilation of proposals), U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp.
No. 22A, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996).
84. Rome Statute of International Criminal Court, supra note 8, at art. 7(1).
85. Id. at art. 7(2)(a).
86. I am indebted to Prof. Bassiouni for this analysis.
87. BASSIOUNI, supra note 15, at 202-03.
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Finally, the definition of this offense under the ICC Statute reflects the
development of customary international law requiring neither a nexus
between "crimes against humanity" and armed conflict nor a requirement of
a discriminatory intent.
Having examined the developing law of crimes against humanity, the
following section will discuss and examine the international and jurisdictional
elements, which elevate an ordinary act under domestic prosecution to a
crime against humanity under international criminal law.
III. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR "CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY"
In order to amount to a crime against humanity, the acts of an accused
must be part of a widespread or systematic attack 'directed against any
civilian population.' This phrase has been interpreted by the international
tribunals as encompassing the following five elements: (1) there must be
an attack; (2) the acts of the perpetrator must be part of the attack; (3)
the attack must be directed against any civilian population; (4) the attack
must be widespread or systematic; (5) the perpetrator must know that the
acts constitute part of a pattern of widespread or systematic crimes
directed against a civilian population and know that the acts fit into such
a pattern. Yet, the choices of the international community with respect
to the elements of "crimes against humanity" both reflect and shape the
international legal and moral order. The decision to reject a requirement
of a nexus with armed conflict evidences the erosion of the traditional
approach to State sovereignty. 89 This section will evaluate the elements
of "crimes against humanity" that have been included or proposed in
various international documents and relevant case law.
A. Nexus to Armed Conflict
1. Nuremberg and the Post World War H Trials
As indicated in Part 1, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters define
"crimes against humanity" as requiring a nexus with the other crimes
over which the International Military Tribunal (IMT) had jurisdiction,
namely crimes against peace and war crimes. Disagreement remains,
88. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A), Judgment, at para. 85 (June
12, 2002) (footnotes omitted).
89. Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman, The Road from Rome: The Developing Law of
Crimes Against Humanity, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 335, 354 (2000).
however, over whether the requisite nexus in the definition suggests that
international law requires a connection between "crimes against humanity"
and armed conflict, or that the Nuremberg Charter limited the jurisdiction of
the IMT to a certain set of crimes against humanity (i.e., those connected
with crimes against peace and war crimes).90 Interestingly, in 1946, Schwelb
observed that, "crimes against humanity," as defined in the Nuremberg
Charter, are not the "cornerstone of a system of international criminal
law equally applicable in times of war and of peace, protecting the
human rights of inhabitants of all countries." 91 He added:
The term as interpreted in the Nuremberg Judgment, has a considerably
narrower connotation. It is, as it were, a kind of by-product of war, applicable
only in time of war or in connexion with war and destined primarily, if not
exclusively, to protect the inhabitants of foreign countries against crimes
committed, in connexion with an aggressive war, by the authorities and organs
of the aggressor State. It serves to cover cases not covered by norms forming
part of the traditional 'laws and customs of war'. It denotes a particular type of
war crime, and is a kind of clausula generalis, the purpose of which is to make
sure that inhumane acts violating general principles of the laws of all civilized
nations committed in connexion with war should not go unpunished. As
defined in the Nuremberg Judgment, the crime against humanity is an
"accompanying" or an "accessory" crime to either crimes against peace or
violations of the laws and customs of war.
92
The judgments of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals did not clarify
whether the nexus requirement was intended as an element of the
substantive offense, or simply as a restriction on the jurisdiction of the
Tribunals. Likewise, cases under CCL No. 10 did not reveal a consensus
position. The Einsatzgruppen and Justice cases under CCL No. 10 Trials
suggested that the nexus requirement was legally unnecessary.93 On the
contrary, in United States v. Flick et al., the court acquitted the
defendant of "crimes against humanity" for his acquisition of Jewish
property before the war, finding itself without jurisdiction. 94 In United
States v. von Weizsaecker et al., the tribunal dismissed the counts of
"crimes against humanity" against officials in the Nazi foreign ministry
90. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 49-50.
91. Schwelb, supra note 18, at 206.
92. Id.
93. United States v. Ohlendorf (Einsatzgruppen Trial), 15 I.L.R. 656 (1948);
United States v. Alstotter (1948 Justice Case), in TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 VOL. III 956
(U.S. Gov. Printing Office 1951). As mentioned already in the present study, the nexus
to war was not included in the definition of crimes against humanity contained in CCL
No. 10. Notwithstanding, the preamble to CCL No. 10 indicated that it was intended to
give effect to the Nuremberg Charter, the formulation of Article 11(c) of CCL No. 10
removed the connection requirement with either crimes against peace or war crimes.
94. United States v. Flick, in TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 VOL. VI, 1216 (U.S. Gov.
Printing Office 1951).
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and other bureaucracies, noting that CCL No. 10 was meant to go no
further than the Nuremberg Tribunal itself, which codified international
law.95
From the above quoted judgments, one might deduce the legacy of the
Nuremberg trials is one of uncertainty with regard to the nexus requirement.96
Subsequent international instruments support the view that a nexus to
armed conflict is not a requirement.97
In its report on the development of the laws of war at the conclusion
of the Nuremberg and CCL No. 10 trials, the UNWCC concluded that
international law may now sanction individuals for "crimes against humanity"
committed not only during war but also during peace. 98 It is to be noted
that the war-connecting link was removed in a 1950 Report of the ILC. 99
The next developments were the adoption of the ICTY and ICTR
Statues by the Security Council. 'However, the existence of armed conflict
was explicitly required under the ICTY Statute; the elimination of such
requirement was evident at the Statute of the ICTR.
Interestingly, the U.N. Secretary General's report to the Security Council,
to which the Draft ICTY Statute was annexed, states that crimes against
humanity "are aimed at any civilian population and are prohibited regardless
of whether they are committed in an armed conflict, international or
internal in character." 100 Most notably, in the Tadic case, the Appeals
Chamber found that Article 5 did not impose any substantive connection
95. United States v. von Weizsaecker, in TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 Vol. VII 694
(U.S. Gov. Printing Office 1951).
96. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 1.
97. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
of 1948, which dealt with this particularly serious form of "crimes against humanity,"
affirmed that genocide is a crime "whether committed in time of peace or in time of
war." Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan 12, 1951). Likewise, the 1968 Convention
on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity refers to crimes against humanity "whether committed in time of war or in
time of peace." Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp.
No. 18, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968). Similarly, the conventions and declaration on
apartheid and forced disappearance, which declare that such acts can amount to crimes
against humanity, do not suggest any nexus to armed conflict (Article 1).
98. UNWCC, supra note 30.
99. International Law Commission Report on Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal,
supra note 48.
100. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at para. 47, U.N. doc. S/25704 (1993).
between the crime and the armed conflict. The Appeals Chamber held,
remarkably, that under Article 5 "[a] nexus between the accused's acts
and the armed conflict is not required... . The armed conflict requirement
is satisfied by proof that there was an armed conflict; that is all the
Statute requires, and in so doing, it requires more than does customary
international law."'' ° The Appeals Chamber emphasised that "the armed
conflict requirement is a jurisdictional element, not a substantive element of
the mens rea of crimes against humanity."'' 0 2 Recently, in Krnojelac, the
Trial Chamber of the Yugoslav Tribunal refers to this element as a
"jurisdictional requirement."10 3
2. Domestic Prosecution of "Crimes Against Humanity"
As mentioned above, the war-connecting link was removed in a 1950
Report of the ILC. But since a Report of the JLC has no binding effect,
unless it is considered as a progressive codification of customary international
law and therefore binding to its content, the practice of States remains an
important element in addition to the element of opinio juris to establish
customary international law. 10 4 Nearly all domestic prosecutions since
World War II for "crimes against humanity" have concerned crimes
associated with the war and the axis power. The Israeli Statute, used for
the prosecution of Eichmann, lacks a nexus requirement, although the
issue was irrelevant during his prosecution. 10 5 The Barbie and Touvier
decisions skirted the nexus question, as both defendants' actions were
clearly linked to other crimes. 0 6 In 1992 France enacted a new Criminal
101. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1 -A, Judgment, at para. 251 (July 15, 1999).
102. Id. at para. 249.
103. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, at para. 53 (March
15, 2002). More demandingly, the Appeals Chamber in Kunurac asserts that the
existence of an armed conflict is "a purely jurisdictional prerequisite which is satisfied
by proof that there was an armed conflict and that objectively the acts of the accused are
linked geographically as well as temporally with the armed conflict." Thus, this
requirement amounts to an objective contextual element which requires the Prosecutor to
prove the existence of an armed conflict "at the relevant time and place" beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23-A, Judgment, at
para. 85 (June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Simic et al., Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, at
para. 38, (October 17, 2003); Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, at
para. 618 (July 31, 2003).
104. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(b)-
(c), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060.
105. Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Dist. Ct. of Jerusalem,
1961), 36 I.L.R. 277 (S. Ct. of Israel, 1962).
106. Fd6ration Nationale des D~portes et Internes R6sistants et Patriotes v. Barbie,
78 I.L.R. 125, (Ct. of Cassation Crim. Chamber 1988); Touvier, 100 I.L.R. 338, 362 (Ct.
App. of Paris & Cassation Crim. Chamber 1992). For further details on these cases and
the French prosecution of war criminals in general, see Leila Sadat Wexler, The
Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation : From
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Code of Crimes Against Humanity of which Article 212-1 lacks the
nexus requirement. 107 In Regina v. Finta, neither the Ontario Court of
High Justice nor the Supreme Court addressed the nexus requirement.
10 8
3. The Rome Conference
There were different views as to whether it was necessary to include a
nexus to an armed conflict, which was not included in the ICTR Statute.
One perspective emphasized that three of the major precedents (the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters and the ICTY Statute) required a nexus
to armed conflict, and the deviation of the ICTR Statute should not be
considered sufficient to change international law. 109 The Report of the
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an international criminal
court (1996) reveals that several views were expressed that "crimes
against humanity" could occur in time of armed conflict or in time of
peace. The Report also stated that the armed conflict nexus that appeared in
the Nuremberg Charter was no longer required under existing law, with
attention being drawn to Article I of the Genocide Convention, CCL No.
10, the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, the ICTR Statute, the ICTY
Appeals Chamber decision in the Tadic, and the 1996 Draft Code. The
view was also expressed that although "crimes against humanity" often
occur in situations involving armed conflict, these crimes could also
occur in time of peace or in situations that were ambiguous.' 1 0
The most important consideration preoccupying delegates' concerns
was that to include a nexus requirement would arguably render Article 7
of the ICC Statute redundant and ineffective. In other words, if a nexus
was required, then almost every act falling within Article 7 would
already be subsumed under Article 8 (war crimes), and it would always
Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289 (1994).
107. Quoted in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 1062
(Jordan J. Paust et al. eds., 1996).
108. Regina [R.] v. Finta, (1994)1 S.C.R. 701 (Can.).
109. Darryl Robison, Crimes Against Humanity: Reflections on State Sovereignty,
Legal Precision and the Dictates of the Public Conscience, in ESSAYS ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 144-49 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A.
Schabas eds., 1999).
110. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 22, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996),
reprinted in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 399 (1998).
be preferable to prove the offence under Article 8, since plan, policy,
and scale as defined in the chapeau of Article 8 are not ingredient
elements for war crimes. 11 As evidenced from the chapeau of Article 7
of the ICC, States' delegates finally decided not to include the nexus
requirement." 2 This will make the ICC much more effective in responding
to mass atrocities.' 13
B. Discriminatory Intent
1. From Nuremberg to Rwanda
Unlike Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, Article 5 of the ICTY does not
contain an express requirement that crimes against humanity be committed
"on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds." This requirement
of discrimination was not contained in the Nuremberg Charter, which
clearly recognized two categories of "crimes against humanity": those
related to inhumane acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement
and deportation; and persecution on political, racial or religious grounds.
Nor can support for this position be found in CCL No. 10. Likewise, the
Tokyo Charter does not contain this requirement. 14
The analysis of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment prepared by the
United Nations shortly after the Trial of the Major War Criminals stated:
It might perhaps be argued that the phrase "on political, racial or religious
grounds" refers not only to persecutions but also to the first type of crimes
against humanity. The British Chief Prosecutor possibly held that opinion as he
spoke of "murder, extermination, enslavement, persecution on political racial or
religious ground. This interpretation, however, seems hardly to be warranted by
the English wording and still less by the French text ... Moreover, in its
statement with regard to von Schirach's guilt the Court designated the crimes
against humanity as "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts" and "persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds. 15
The above citation clearly shows that the requisite discriminatory grounds
were limited to the second category of "crimes against humanity,"
namely the persecution type.
Turning to the ICTR Statute, it has been observed that the inclusion of
the words "on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds" in
111. William J. Fenrick et al., Article 8: War Crimes, in COMMENTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY
ARTICLE 173, 181 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
112. Rome Statute of International Criminal Court, supra note 8, at art. 7(1).
113. Robinson, supra note 109, at 148.
114. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, at para. 650
(May 7, 1997).
115. Memorandum of the Secretary-General on the Charter and Judgement of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, quoted in Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I -T, at para. 650.
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the chapeau of Article 3 raises two important questions of interpretation.
Firstly, is it the "attack" (understood as the widespread or systematic
context of the act in question) or the individual act itself that must be
committed on discriminatory grounds? Secondly, does the requirement
incorporate some additional mental element by requiring discriminatory
intent on the part of an accused?' 16 Addressing this point, the Rwanda
Tribunal has proposed the following interpretation of the provision:
Firstly, in a scenario where the perpetrator's intention is to exterminate the Tutsi
group and, in furtherance of this intent, he kills a Belgium Priest who is
protecting the Tutsi, the Trial Chamber opines that such an act would be based
on discrimination against the Tutsi group... [secondly,] where the perpetrator
attacks people on the grounds and in the belief that they are members of a group
but, in fact, they are not, for example, where the perpetrator believes that a group
of Tutsi are supporters of the Rwandese Patriotic Front RPF and therefore
accomplices. In the scenario, the Trial Chambers opines that the Prosecution must
show that the perpetrator's belief was objectively reasonable-based upon real facts
rather than being mere speculation or perverted deduction."
1 17
However, the above observations do not purport to outline the requirements
for discrimination, but they do indicate two important factors. Firstly, it
is the element of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity (in this case)
that is required, rather than the specific ethnicity of the victim.
Secondly, it is indeed possible that a distinct "widespread or systematic
attack directed against a civilian population" could include a discriminatory
element that is premised on a mistake (such as the belief that a particular
group of Tutsi civilians is supporting the Rwandese Patriotic Front).
Thus, in the context of such an attack, however, it is not necessary to
inquire into the subjective state of mind of the accused.' 18
To read the widespread and systematic attack against a civilian
population on discriminatory grounds as necessarily requiring that an
enumerated crime be committed for discriminatory reasons would be to
116. Simon Chesterman, An Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements of
Crimes Against Humanity, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 307, 326 (2000). It should be
noted that the French Court of Cassation in the Barbie case ruled that the perpetrator of
crimes against humanity must be motivated by discriminatory intent based on political,
racial, or religious grounds. Likewise, the Supreme Court of Canada required a
discriminatory motive, even though it was not explicitly included in Section 7(3.76) of
the Canadian Criminal Code. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 46, sec 7(3.76) (1985),
repealed by Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, ch. 24, at para 42, 2000
S.C. 26 (Can.).
117. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, at para. 131-32
(May 21, 1999).
118. Chesterman, supra note 116, at 327-28.
transform this merely jurisdictional limitation under Article 3 of the
ICTR Statute into a substantive element of the mens rea of crimes
against humanity. In Rutaganda, the Prosecution asserted that any other
interpretation would mean that the perpetrators of crimes against
humanity could evade conviction by invoking other motives in defence
of their conduct. It argues that this would create significant lacunae by
failing to protect victims who are killed on non-discriminatory grounds
by perpetrators who, nonetheless, fully realise that their acts are
connected to, or part of, a widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population on discriminatory grounds." 9
It is to be noted that the Prosecution has raised the same ground of
Appeal in Akayesu. 120 The issue before the Akayesu Appeals Chamber
was to determine whether the inclusion of this discriminatory grounds
within the chapeau of Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, (a) requires the
perpetrator to have knowledge that his act(s) is part of or is in furtherance of
a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population on
discriminatory grounds, or (b) whether this ingredient (the discriminatory
grounds) requires that the perpetrator of each crime enumerated in
Article 3 of the Rwandan Statute must have the discriminatory intent to
commit the said crime against his victim in particular, on one of the
enumerated grounds.' 21 Considering this ground of Appeal by the
Prosecution, the Appeals Chamber finds that:
The meaning to be collected from Article 3 of the Statute is that even if the
accused did not have a discriminatory intent when he committed the act charged
against particular victim, he nevertheless knew that his act could further a
discriminatory attack against a civilian population; the attack could even be
perpetrated by other persons and the accused could even object it. As a result,
where it is shown that the accused had knowledge of such objective nexus, the
Prosecutor is under no obligation to go forward with a showing that the crime
charged was committed against a particular victim with a discriminatory
intent. 1
22
Finally, the Appeals Chamber concludes that Article 3 of the ICTR
Statute does not require that all crimes against humanity enumerated
therein be committed with a discriminatory intent.123
Even though the ICTY Statute does not require a discriminatory intent
for all "crimes against humanity," this discriminatory element was
reluctantly adopted in the Tadic judgment. 24 The only reason why the
119. Prosecution's Appeal Brief, Rutaganda, filed Dec. 11, 2000, para. 2.15.
120. Prosecution Appeal Brief, Akayesu, Case No. IT-96-4-A, filed July 10, 2000.
121. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. IT-96-4-A, Judgment, at para. 459 (June 1,
2001).
122. Id. at para. 465.
123. Id. at para. 469.
124. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I -T, at para. 652.
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Trial Chamber included this discriminatory element was because it was
incorporated in the Report of the Secretary-General in paragraph 48, and
because "several Security Council members stated that they interpreted
Article 5 as referring to acts taken on a discriminatory basis". 2 5 Additionally,
this requirement is not contained in the 1996 ILC Draft Code.
2 6
The adoption of discriminatory element in the Tadic Judgment was
criticised by the Prosecution. The Prosecution argued that the ICTY
should rely on statements of Security Council members as tools for
interpretation only where there is an "obvious lacuna" in the text of the
Statute. 127 The Prosecution also demonstrated that the Trial Chamber
destabilized the structure of the Statute. Firstly, this interpretation relegated
the persecution clause to a residual provision that would apply to "a
small class of cases not covers by other provisions of Article 5. '' 28
Secondly, it rendered Article 5(i), the "other inhuman acts" clause,
redundant. The Prosecution further argued, that the persecution clause
should instead be read to provide a basis for additional criminal liability
for inhuman acts when committed on discriminatory intent. In other
words, if a defendant is charged with an intentional killing motivated by
racial animus, she or he should be held responsible under Article 5(a)
"murder" as well as under Article 5(h) "persecution. 129
Moreover, such a subjective element is open to criticism by those whose
criminal justice systems do not grant any relevance to subjective motives in
the determination of individual criminal responsibility.  Finally, the
Appeals Chamber in Tadic found that the Trial Chamber erred in finding
that all crimes against humanity require a discriminatory intent. It held that
"[S]uch an intent is an indispensable legal ingredient of the offence only
with regard to those crimes for which this expressly required, that is, for
Article 5(h), concerning various types of persecution."' 3'
125. Id.
126. See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, supra
note 55.
127. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Brief of Argument of the Prosecution
(Cross-Appellant), at para 68 ( January 12, 1998), quoted in Van Schaak, supra note 13,
at 839.
128. Van Schaak, supra note 13, at 839. See Tadic, Case No. IT-94- I-T, at para. 702.
129. Van Schaak, supra note 13, at 839.
130. David Donat-Cattin, Crimes Against Humanity, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT STATUTE 49, 56 (Flavia Lattanzi ed., 1998)
(it is to be noted that motives may be taken into consideration by the judge once
individual responsibility has been established at the time of penalty determination).
131. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94- l-A, Judgment, at para. 305 (July 15, 1999).
2. No Discriminatory Intent Under Article 7 of the ICC Statute
A few delegations, notably France, suggested that crimes against humanity
required an element of discrimination (for example, that they must be
committed on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds) as
contained in the ICTR Statute. However, the overwhelming majority of
delegations were opposed to this requirement. The opponents expressed
their view that the inclusion of such a criterion would complicate the
task of the Prosecution by significantly increasing its burden of proof in
requiring evidence of such a subjective element, and that crimes against
humanity could be committed against other groups including intellectuals,
and social, cultural or political groups, since the definition of genocide
might not be expanded to cover them. In the view of the majority,
customary international law required a discriminatory element only for
the inhuman act of "persecution," and not for other "crimes against
humanity." The view of the majority not to include a discriminatory
ground of all crimes against humanity meets the criteria elaborated
within international law and practice.
32
C. "Attack Directed Against any Civilian Population"
It is notable that the Nuremberg Charter as well as the three Statutes
under consideration contain the words "against any civilian population"
in the provision of "crimes against humanity."' 33 The expression "directed
against" is an expression which specifies that in the context of a crime
against humanity the civilian population is the primary object of the
attack.' 134 That is to say that, the phrase 'directed against' requires "that
the civilian population which is subjected to the attack must be the
primary rather than an incidental target of the attack."'' 35 In order to
determine whether the attack may be said to have been so directed, the
Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslav Tribunal set forth the following
decisive factors: the means and method used in the course of the attack;
the status of the victims and their numbers; the discriminatory nature of
the attack; the nature of the crime committed in its course; and the
132. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 22, U.N. Doc. A/51/22
(1996).
133. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(c), 58
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, Article 5 of the ICTY, Article 3 of the ICTR, and Rome
Statute of International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., art. 7, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
134. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1 -A, Judgment, at para. 85 (June 12,
2002) (footnotes omitted).
135. Id. at para. 92.
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resistance of the assailants at the time and the extent to which the
attacking force may be said to have complied or attempted to comply
with the precautionary requirements of the laws of war.
13
The requirement in the Nuremberg Charter and the three Statutes that
enumerated acts be "directed against any civilian population" contains
several elements which will be discussed below.
1. The Clarification of the Adjective "Any"
Before examining the meaning of the word "civilian," it seems preferable
to refer to Tadic, where the Trial Chamber illustrates the meaning of the
adjective "any" by stating "the inclusion of the word 'any' makes it clear
that crimes against humanity can be committed against civilians of the
same nationality as the perpetrator or those who are stateless, as well as
those of a different nationality." '137 The term "any civilian population"
must be interpreted broadly. It seeks to place emphasis more on the
collective aspect of the crime than on the status of the victims. 138 The
words of the Trial Chamber are self-explanatory; however the remaining
aspects, namely the definition of a "civilian" and the implications of the
term "population," require further examination.
2. The Meaning of "Civilian"
The UNWCC stated in reference to Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg
Charter that "the words 'civilian population' appear to indicate that
'crimes against humanity' are restricted to inhumane acts committed
against civilians as opposed to members of the armed forces .... 139 On
the contrary, Schwelb observed in his analysis of the text of Article 6(c)
of the Nuremberg Charter that members of the armed forces may be
136. Id. atpara. 91.
137. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, at para. 634
(May 7, 1997). See also Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, at para.
54 (December 14, 1999). It should be pointed out that Schwelb in his analysis of the text
of Article 6(c) of the Charter wrote that "From the word 'against any civilian population'
it follows that a crime against humanity can be committed both against the civilian
population of territory which is under belligerent occupation and against the civilian
population of other territories, irrespective of whether they are under some other type of
occupation or whether they are under no occupation at all. The civilian population
protected by the provision may therefore also include the civilian population of a country
which was occupied without resort to war .... Schwelb, supra note 18, at 188.
138. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T at para. 54.
139. U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 16, at 193.
considered as potential victims of crimes against humanity of persecution. 140
Focusing on the word "civilian," the Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 noted that while the term
"any civilian population" principally applies to non-combatants, it does
not necessarily exclude those "who at one particular point in time did
bear arms." 14' Thus, for instance, crimes committed against those who
use arms to defend themselves or their community, such as the "sole
policeman or local defence guard," may still come within the definition
of "crimes against humanity". 1
42
The above-mentioned principle, as expressed in the statement of the
Commission of Experts, was confirmed, inter alia, in the Vukovar decision
of the ICTY. 43  In that case the Trial Chamber held that "although
crimes against humanity must target a civilian population, individuals
who at one time performed acts of resistance may in certain circumstances
be victims of crimes against humanity."' 44 This exact issue was examined
in the Barbie case.' 45 The Cour de Cassation held that "members of the
Resistance could be victims of crimes against humanity as long as the
necessary intent for crimes against humanity was present."
4 6
It could be argued that a civilian population may lose its character as
civilian if there are certain non-civilians present. The case law of the
140. Schwelb, supra note 18, at 190-91. In 1946, Schwelb wrote: "The Charter
speaks of 'any civilian population.' This appears to indicate that the term 'crime against
humanity' is restricted to inhumane acts committed against civilian populations as
distinct from members of the armed forces. This restriction applies at least to those acts
constituting crimes against humanity which are enumerated in the passage of Article 6(c)
preceding the words 'against any civilian population' i.e. to murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts. in interpreting the text, doubts may
arise as to whether this restriction to the civilian population applies also to such acts
constituting crimes against humanity as do not fall under any of these enumerated
categories of the murder type. On the face of it, it would appear that 'persecutions on
political, racial, or religious grounds' are such acts. It could therefore be maintained that
persecutions, as distinct from crimes of the murder type, may be committed by acts
directed against members of the armed forces."
141. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to the
Security Council Resolution 780, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex, at 21, U.N Doc.
S/1994/674 (1994).
142. Id. at 22.
143. Vukovar Hospital Decision, supra note 72, at para. 29.
144. Id.
145. Fdration Nationale des Dportes et Internes Rrsistants et Patriotes. v. Barbie,
quoted in Tadic, Case No. IT-94- I -T, at para. 641.
146. Id. "In this case the Chambre d'accusation of the Court of Appeal of Lyons
ordered that an indictment for crimes against humanity be issued against Klaus Barbie,
head of the Gestapo of Lyons during the Second World War, but only for 'persecutions
against innocent Jews,' and held that prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations
for crimes committed by Barbie against combatants who were members of the
Resistance or whom Barbie thought were members of the Resistance, even if they were
Jewish, because these acts could only constitute war crimes and not crimes against
humanity."
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Rwanda Tribunal is more illustrative regarding this issue. In Musema,
147
as well as Akayesu148 ,and Rutaganda, 49 the ICTR held that "[t]he fact
that there are certain individuals among the civilian population who are
not civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character."
That is to say, the targeted population must be predominantly civilian in
nature but the presence of certain non-civilians in their midst does not
change the character of that population.150 In addition, in Kunarac, the
Trial Chamber stated that "a person shall be considered to be a civilian
for as long as there is a doubt as to his or her status". 15  The Judgment
continues:
As a group, the civilian population shall never be attacked as such. Additionally,
customary international law obliges parties to the conflict to distinguish at all
times between the civilian population and combatants, and obliges them not to
attack a military objective if the attack is likely to cause civilian casualties or
damage which would be excessive in relation to the military advantage
participated. 15
2
The Kunarac Trial Judgement also provides that the term "any" civilian
population includes a state's attack on that state's population. It is
"therefore unnecessary to demonstrate that the victims are linked to any
particular side of the conflict."1 5 3 Most notably, in Rutaganda, the Trial
Chamber considers as an ingredient legal element of crimes against
humanity that the actus reus must be committed against members of the
civilian population. 154 This finding was appealed by the Prosecution on
the ground that the Trial Chamber committed an error of law of general
147. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment, at para. 207 (Jan.
27, 2000).
148. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, at paras. 582, 610
(Sept. 2, 1998).
149. Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, at para. 72 (Dec.
6, 1999).
150. Prosecutor v Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-I-T, Judgement, at para. 128
(May 21, 1999). The Blaskic Trial Chamber further held that it is the "specific situation
of the victim at the moment the crimes were committed, rather than his status, that must
be taken into account in determining his standing as a civilian" and therefore "soldiers
within an intentionally targeted civilian population does not alter the civilian nature of
the population," Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T Judgment, at para. 214
(Mar. 3, 2000); See also Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-OIA Judgment,
at para. 79 (June 7, 2001).
151. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T, IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, at
para. 426 (Feb. 22, 2001).
152. Id.
153. Id. at para. 423.
154. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, at paras. 66, 72.
significance to the Tribunal's jurisprudence in finding that the actus reus
of a crime against humanity must be committed against a civilian
population. 155
As evidenced by the case law of the ICTY and the ICTR, it is beyond
any shadow of doubt that both Tribunals adduced clarifications as
regards the notion of "civilian population" on the basis of Common
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, while assuring that reference
to the latter provision was made only by way of analogy.1 6 Moreover, it
is to be noted that in several decisions the ICTY and ICTR justified their
reference to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions by pointing
to the customary status of the notion of civilian population contained in
these instruments. 1
57
3. The Meaning of "Population"
The Nuremberg Charter and the three Statutes under consideration
require that the prohibited acts be directed against any civilian "population."',
58
The term "population" as it is employed at the Nuremberg Charter
"indicates that a larger body of victims is visualized and that single or
isolated acts committed against individuals are outside the scope."
159
Likewise, in Tadic, the Trial Chamber interpreted the term "population"
by stating that:
[Tihe requirement in Article 5 of the Statute that the prohibited acts must be
directed against a civilian "population" does not mean that the entire population
of a given State or territory must be victimized by these acts in order for the acts
to constitute crimes against humanity. Instead the "population" element is
intended to imply crimes of a collective nature and thus exclude single or
isolated acts which, although possibly constituting war crimes or crimes against
national penal legislation, do not rise to the level of crimes against humanity. 60
Surprisingly, the Trial Chamber appeared to contradict itself when it
later concluded that a single act could in fact constitute a "crime against
humanity": "Clearly, a single act by a perpetrator taken within the
context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population
155. Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Prosecution Appeal Brief,
filed Dec. 11, 2000, at 40-42.
156. Flavia Lattanzi, Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF
CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 473,488 (Horst Fischer, et al. eds., 2001).
157. Id. See the broad definition given to civilians for the purpose of the Geneva
Conventions in Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, at paras. 244-77
(Nov. 16, 1998).
158. See the Nuremberg Charter art. 6 (c); the ICTY Statute, art. 5; the ICTR
Statute art. 3; and the ICC Statute, art. 7(1).
159. Schwelb, supra note 18, at 191.
160. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-l-T, at para. 644
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entails individual criminal responsibility, and an individual need not
commit numerous offences to be held liable."' 161
It has been observed that the term "population" as employed in the
ICTR Statute as a part of the phrase "attack against any civilian population
on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds," may be interpreted
as requiring the targeted population to represent a specific group.
162
This interpretation is contrary to the humanitarian law's definition,
where the "civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians.'
' 63
In light of the above, the "population" element is intended to imply
crimes of collective nature and thus exclude single or isolated acts.
"Thus the emphasis is not on the individual victim but rather on the
collective, the individual being victimized not because of his individual
attributes but rather because of his membership of a targeted civilian
population."'6 Recently, in Kunarac, the Appeals Chamber emphasized:
The use of the word "population" does not mean that the entire population of
the geographical entity in which the attack is taking place must have been
subjected to that attack .... It is sufficient to show that enough individuals were
targeted in the course of the attack, or that they were targeted in such a way as
to satisfy the Chamber that the attack was in fact directed against a civilian
"population," rather than against a limited and randomly selected number ofindividuals.165
4. The Meaning of "Attack"
The term "attack" in the context of a "crime against humanity" carries
a slightly different meaning than under the laws of war.166 It can be
described as a course of conduct involving the commission of acts of
violence. 167 The term was precisely defined in the judgment rendered by
161. Id. at para. 649.
162. Chesterman, supra note 116, at 325.
163. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 7, 1978, art. 50,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 448 (Adam Roberts &
Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed., 2000).
164. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, at para. 644.
165. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1 -A, Judgment, para. 90 (June 12,
2002) (footnotes omitted).
166. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 7, 1978, art.
49, at para. 1, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (defining "attacks" as "acts of violence against the
adversary, whether in offence or in defence.")
167. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1 -T at para. 644. The Trial Chamber in that case stated that:
"the inclusion in Article 5, that the acts be 'directed against any civilian population,' ensures
that what is to be alleged will not be one particular act but instead, a course of conduct."
Trial Chamber II in Kunarac,168 where the Chamber wrote:
the term 'attack' in the context of a crime against humanity is not limited to the
conduct of hostilities. It may also include situations of mistreatment of persons
taking no active part in hostilities, such as someone in detention. However,
both terms are based on a similar assumption, namely that war should be a
matter between armed forces or armed groups and that the civilian population
cannot be a legitimate target.169
Unlike the ICTY Statute, an "attack" under the terms of the ICTR bears
no necessary relation to an armed conflict. Instead, it refers to the context
of the acts, which are enumerated in Article 3, paragraphs (a) through (i)
of the ICTR Statute. In Akayesu, the ICTR Trial Chamber I held that an
attack may be defined as an unlawful act of the kind enumerated in the
ICTR Statute, like murder, extermination, etc., notingthat an attack may
be non-violent in nature. 170 Likewise, in Kayishema,r7 Trial Chamber II
defined the term attack as an event that encompasses the enumerated
crimes.
Most notably, the ICTY noted that the existence of an attack upon one
side's civilian population would not disprove or cancel out that side's
attack upon the other's civilian population:
When establishing whether there was an attack upon a particular civilian
population, it is not relevant that the other side also committed atrocities against
its opponent's civilian population .... The existence of an attack from one side
against the other side's civilian population would neither justify the attack by
that other side against the civilian population of its opponent nor displace the
conclusion that the other side's forces were in fact targeting a civilian
population as such . . . . Each attack against the other's civilian population
would be equally illegitimate and crimes committed as part of this attack could,
if all other conditions being met, amount to crimes against humanity. 172
A major source of concern is that the term "attack" as defined in sub-
paragraph 2(a) of Article 7 of the ICC Statute could bind the Court to
exercise jurisdiction in cases of crimes in which the conduct is a single
act and there is not "the multiple commission of acts referred to in
paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance
168. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T, IT-96-23/I-T, at paras. 415-16.
169. Id. at para. 416.
170. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, at para. 581 (Sept.
2, 1999). The Trial Chamber in that case asserts: "[t]he concept of 'attack' may be
defined as an unlawful act of the kind enumerated in Article 3(a) to (I)... of the Statute,
like murder extermination, enslavement etc. An attack may also be non violent in nature,
like imposing a system of apartheid, which is declared a crime against humanity in
Article I of the Apartheid Convention of 1973, or exerting pressure on the population to
act in a particular manner, may come under the purview of an attack, if orchestrated on a
massive scale or in a systematic manner."
171. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-I-T, Judgment, at para. 122
(May 21, 1999).
172. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, at para. 87 (footnotes omitted).
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of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack," as Article
7(2)(a) reads. On the other hand, there is no doubt that a single act might
intentionally cause great suffering and be "of concern to the international
community as whole."'173 Presumably, one can argue that if only one of
the Twin Towers in the United States of America were to have been
attacked, this act would not have fulfilled the provision of Article 7(2)(a)
as there was no multiple commission of acts. Such a single attack in any
case would have been a crime against humanity and it deserves to be
dealt with by an international criminal jurisdiction even though it does
not satisfy the above mentioned conditions under Article 7 of the Rome
Statute.
The lack of such provision of the actus reus under Part 3 of the ICC
Statute on the one hand, and the inclusion of the provision of nullum
crimen sine lege on the other has preoccupied scholarly concerns, since
some omission resulting in "crimes against humanity" may not fulfill the
requirement of being "part of a widespread or systematic attack."'174 In
this respect the requirement in Article 22(2) of the ICC Statute that "the
definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended
by analogy" may be problematic, since acts of murder or extermination.
could be committed through omissions (the so called "commission
through omission"). Accordingly, the Court will find that it has no jurisdiction
concerning such acts.
In order to illustrate the above issue, a scholar exemplifies the "[c]ase
of a village being isolated by an organized force that does not allow any
communication with the external world. Casualties from famine generated
by such criminal conduct may amount to hundreds or thousands."'75 He
added "the omission to save the lives of the population may run the risk
not to be qualified as an attack, or part of an attack, especially considering
the fact that "crimes against humanity" can be committed in peace time,
and not only in the course of an armed conflict." Finally, he recommends
the deletion of any reference to the term "attack" in the general part of
173. See U.N. Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Criminal Court, supra note 10, at 9.
174. It should be noted that the travaux pr~paratoires of the ICC before the
Diplomatic Conference defines, in para. I of Article 22(G), entitled "Actus reus (act
and/or omission)" the objective element of crimes as follows: "Conduct for which a
person may be criminally responsible and liable for punishment as a crime can constitute
either an act or an omission, or a combination thereof." See Decisions Taken by the
Preparatory Committee at its Session Held From 11 to 21 February 1997, at 26-27,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/ 1997/L.5 (1997).
175. Donat-Cattin, supra note 125, at 54-55.
the definition of "crimes against humanity" and includes the phrase "acts
when committed as a part of a widespread or systematic commission of
such acts against any population."'' 76 Unfortunately, the finalized draft text
of the Elements of Crimes does not provide any assistance in this matter. 1
77
In principal, the acts of the accused must constitute part of the attack. It
was held that the nexus between the acts of the accused and the attack
requires the existence of two elements: (i) the commission of an act
which, by its nature or consequences, is objectively part of the attack;
coupled with (ii) knowledge on the part of the accused that there is an
attack on the civilian population and that his act is part thereof.'78 But this
does not mean that the acts of the accused must be committed in the midst
of that attack. A crime which is committed before or after the main attack
against the civilian population, or away from it, could still, if sufficiently
connected, be part of that attack. On the contrary, a crime would be
regarded as an "isolated act" when it is so far removed from the attack
that, having considered the context and circumstances in which it was
committed, it cannot reasonably be said to have been part of the attack.'79
Generally speaking, the concept of "attack" may be defined as an
unlawful act of the kind enumerated in Articles 5(a) to (i) and 3(a) to (i) of
the ICTY and ICTR Statutes respectively, like murder, extermination,
enslavement, etc. However, "[a]n attack may also be non-violent in
nature, like imposing a system of apartheid, which is declared a crime
against humanity in Article 1 of the Apartheid Convention of 1973... ,,180
Likewise, "exerting pressure on the population to act in a particular
manner may come under the purview of an attack, if orchestrated on a
massive scale or in a systematic manner."' 181
176. Id.
177. It is to be noted that the original proposal for Article 7(2)(a) referred to a
"policy to commit such acts", but this was changed to "policy to commit such attack" in
order to accommodate a concern raised that the former formulation might be restrictively
interpreted as requiring a policy to commit the specific act perpetrated by the accused.
See Women's Caucus for Gender Justice, Priority Concerns about Crimes Against
Humanity, 1 July 1998, quoted in Robinson, supra note 109, at 162. As stated by
Robinson: "The concern was that the formulation might be interpreted as requiring, in a
prosecution of rape as a crime against humanity, proof of a policy to commit rape
specifically. The arguably circular reference to a "policy to commit such attack" was
therefore proposed in order to clarify that what is required is proof of a policy to commit
multiple inhuman acts against a civilian population; sexual assaults occurring as part of
that attack (possibly entailing, for example, murder and persecution) would qualify as
crime against humanity, even if the ringleaders had not specifically contemplated sexual
assaults when they unleashed their campaign."
178. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, at para. 99 (footnotes omitted).
179. Id. at para. 100.
180. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, at para. 581; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case
No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, at para. 70 (Dec. 6, 1999).
181. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, at para. 581.
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D. The Mass or Systematic Nature of the Acts
"Widespread or Systematic"
One of the distinguishing features of "crimes against humanity" is their
pattern of occurrence. 82 The "widespread or systematic" requirement is
fundamental in distinguishing crimes against humanity from common
crimes, which do not rise to the level of crimes under international
law. 183 It is to be noted that "the requirement that the attack be 'widespread'
or 'systematic' comes in the alternative."' 84 Once it is convinced that
either requirement is met, the Trial Chamber is not obliged to consider
whether the alternative qualifier is also satisfied.
1. The Term "Widespread"
The term "widespread" refers to "the number of victims," whereas
"systematic" refers to the existence of a policy or plan. The former "may
be defined as massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively
with considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of
victims.' ' 185 The commentary to the ILC Draft Code further explains this
requirement by stating:
The second alternative requires that the inhumane acts be committed on a large
scale meaning that the acts are directed against a multiplicity of victims ....
The Nuremberg Tribunal further emphasized that the policy of terror was
"certainly carried out on a vast scale" in its consideration of inhumane acts as
possible crimes against humanity .... The term "large scale" in the present
text... is sufficiently broad to cover various situation[s] involving multiplicity
of victims, for example, as a result of the cumulative effect of a series of
inhumane acts or the singular effect of an inhumane act of extraordinary
magnitude.186
The danger in interpreting the terms "widespread or systematic" as
only descriptive of the manner in which the victimization occurs might
182. Recent authorities tend to support the view that the threshold test is disjunctive, not
conjunctive. For further discussion on this issue, see Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-
94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, at paras. 645-48 (May 7, 1997); Robinson, supra note
109, at 152-55.
183. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, at paras. 646-48.
184. Kunarac., Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, at para. 93 (footnotes omitted).
185. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, at para. 580.
186. Draft Code of Crimes Against The Peace and Security of Mankind, in report of
International Law Commission, commentary section, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No.
10, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), available at www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/1996/96repfra.htm;
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, at para. 648.
transform domestic crimes into international crimes on the basis of the
quantitative outcome of the harm and the manner in which it is performed
without wars.' 87 Conversely, the absence of a large number of victims
might exclude such acts from falling under the category of "crimes
against humanity." However, it was held that "an individual committing
a crime against a single victim or a limited number of victims might be
recognised as guilty of a crime against humanity if his acts were part of
the specific context identified above."'
' 88
The execution by Soviet authorities of Hungarian leader Imre Nagy in
'1956 is an example of a crime against humanity lacking a large number
of victims. 89 "In this case, it might be argued that such a planned, systematic
act is not against a 'population' at all, but only against one person, and to
class it as a 'crime against humanity' would risk collapsing such crimes
into common crimes." 90 Yet, to avoid any misunderstanding, a convincing
interpretation would regard the target "against" whom the action is
committed as more than the victim himself. In applying the above
interpretation to the case of Imre Nagy, it would represent a "crime
against humanity," even though the murder itself was not a mass scale,
because the killing of a political leader is systematic insofar as it is
meant to intimidate the entire "civilian population" of his supporters. 191
Yet, it must be emphasized that a single isolated act may constitute
crime against humanity, as far as it is a part of a policy or plan. That
was the decision of the Trial Chamber in Tadic:
Clearly, a single act by a perpetrator taken within the context of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population entails individual criminal
responsibility, and an individual perpetrator need not commit numerous
offences to be held liable. Although it is correct that isolated, random acts
should not be included in the definition of crimes against humanity, that is the
purpose of requiring that the acts be directed against civilian population and
thus "[e]ven an isolated act can constitute a crime against humanity if it is the
product of a political system based on terror or persecution."1 92
A further point that deserves particular mention is that, although the
requisite scale of offensiveness, number of victims and multiplicity of
acts could occur throughout a territory or region, the element of "widespread"
does not depend on establishing any requisite geographic range. As
evidenced by the case law of the ICTY convictions for "crimes against
187. BASSIOUNI, supra note 15, at 243-46.
188. Vukovar Hospital Decision, supra note 72, at para. 30.
189. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 59-60.
190. Id. at 60.
191. Id.
192. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, at para. 649. See also, Vukovar Hospital Decision,
supra note 72, at para. 30.
[VOL. 5: 73, 2004] The Elements of Crimes, Against Humanity
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
humanity" have resulted from acts committed in one town.193 Thus, a
single large-scale act would suffice, or a series of smaller discrete acts
that cumulatively reach the requisite scale and gravity.
In sum, "[t]he concept of 'widespread' may be defined as massive,
frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with considerable
seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims."
194
2. The Term "Systematic"
Whereas the notion of "widespread" refers to a multiplicity of victims,
the term "systematic" refers to a pattern of conduct or methodical plan.
Although the term is not susceptible to a precise definition, it was
explained in the commentary to the ILC Draft Code as follows:
The first alternative requires that the inhumane acts be committed in a
systematic manner meaning pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy. The
implementation of this plan or policy could result in the repeated or continuous
commission of inhuman acts.., the Nuremberg Tribunal emphasized that the
inhumane acts were committed as a part of the policy of terror and were "in
many cases ... organized [and] systematic" in considering whether such acts
constituted crime[s] against humanity. 195
The term was further explained in Akayesu as "thoroughly organized
and following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy involving
substantial public or private resources. ' 96 Yet, "the term "systematic" poses
a very stringent test, requiring not only the existence of a policy but also
highly organized and orchestrated implementation of the policy in
accordance with a developed plan."' 97 Prof. Bassiouni, in his major text
on the subject, notes that the requirement of "widespread or systematic"
as included in the ICTR Statute emphasizes the policy element. He
adds, "it is not the single killing that is targeted, but mass killings, unless
the single killing can be linked to a "systematic" policy or to "widespread"
193. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, at para. 57 (Dec. 14,
1999). In this case the Trial Chamber convicted the accused of crimes against humanity
that were committed in one town, Brcko.
194. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, at para. 580; Prosecutor v Rutaganda, Case
No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgement, at para. 69 (Dec. 6, 1999).
195. Draft Code of Crimes Against The Peace and Security of Mankind, in report of
International Law Commission, commentary section, U.N. GAOR, 51s" Sess., Supp. No.
10, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), available at www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/1996/96repfra.htm;
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, at para. 648.
196. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-T, at para. 648.
197. Robinson, supra note 109, at 161-62.
attacks."' 198 He concludes "the word, "systematic" reflects more of an
existent policy whose proof is more likely to be of a more specific nature
than that of "widespread" attacks, which can be proven objectively and
is more general in nature."'199 Prof. Meron has argued neither widespread
nor systematic are required under Article 5 of the ICTR. He wrote that
the scope of the Rwanda Statute is clouded by the requirement that
crimes against humanity are required to be committed as "widespread or
systematic." He adds with concern "One may ask whether... the Security
Council has not inadvertently made the burden of proving crimes against
humanity more difficult to meet.,
200
The notion of "systematicity" raises the question of whether it is
necessary to prove that a policy or plan is behind an attack under "crimes
against humanity" or whether the proof of any plan or policy is but one
manner to demonstrate the systematic character of the attack. This key
question should better be resolved through the case law of the
international and national tribunals as discussed below.
E. The Unresolved Question of a General Policy Requirement
Although, Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter does not explicitly
refer to a "policy," the Nuremberg judgment provided a short descriptive
passage which emphasizes the "policy of terror" and "policy of persecution,
repression, and murder of civilians. '2 ' In the intervening decades when
the ILC suspended consideration of the Draft Code, national courts were
left to interpret the essential elements of "crimes against humanity. 2 °2
Consequently, the policy element of "crimes against humanity" was
affirmed by the decisions of national courts. For instance, the French
Cour de Cassation in the Barbie and Touvier cases required that "the
criminal act be affiliated with the name of a state practicing a policy of
ideological hegemony.' 20 3 The Netherlands Hoge Raad in the Menten
case held that "the concept of crimes against humanity also requires...
that the crimes in question form part of a system based on terror or
constitute a link in consciously pursued policy directed against particular
198. BASSIOUNI, supra note 15, at 196-99.
199. Id.
200. Theodor Meron, International Criminalisation of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 554, 557 (1995).
201. UNWCC, supra note 30, at 572-73.
202. See generally Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
Forty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 206-08; see generally
U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991).
203. Barbie, French Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), June 3, 1988, reprinted in
100 I.L.R 331, 336 (1995); Touvier French Court of Appeal of Paris (First Chamber of
Accusation), April 13, 1992, reprinted in 100 I.L.R. 338, 350-51 (1995); Court of
Cassation (Criminal Chamber), 27 Nov. 1992, 100 ILR 338 at 351).
[VOL. 5: 73, 2004] The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity
SAN DIEGO INT'L LJ.
groups of peoples.,, 204 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Finta case held that "what distinguishes a crime against humanity from
any other criminal offence under the Canadian Criminal Code is that the
cruel and terrible actions which are essential elements of the offence
were undertaken in pursuance of a policy of discrimination or persecution
,,205-
of an identifiable group or race.
The policy element has subsequently been reflected in the decisions of
the ICTY, ICTR, and in the work of the ILC. However, the Statute of
the ICTY does not include the phrase "widespread or systematic." The
Tadic judgment interpreted the phrase "directed against any civilian
population" as meaning "that the acts must occur on a widespread or
systematic basis, that there must be some form of governmental,
organization or group policy to commit these acts .... ,206
In Kayishema, the ICTR wrote: "for an attack against a civilian
population to pass the threshold required by the definition of the crime
against humanity, it is necessary to prove the existence of a prior plan or
policy. '' 2°7 Yet, it might seem questionable whether it is necessary to
prove that a policy or plan is behind an attack under "crimes against
humanity" or whether the proof of any plan or policy is but one manner
to demonstrate the systematic character of the attack. The issue is not
consistently articulated in the two ad hoc Tribunals' jurisprudence,
although each Trial Chamber concurs that systematic and widespread
remain disjunctive, thus arguably proof of a plan or policy is a necessary
element of crimes against humanity only when opting to establish that an
attack was systematic. °8 In a recent judgment held by the ICTY, the
Appeals Chamber emphasised, "the existence of a policy or plan may be
evidentially relevant, but it is not a legal element of the crime." 09
A further point that deserves particular mention is that the chapeau of
the "Elements of Crimes" adopted by the Preparatory Commission has a
204. Public Prosecutor v. Menten, The Netherlands, District Court of Amsterdam,
Extraordinary Penal Chamber, reprinted in 75 I.L.R. 361-63 (1981).
205. R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 814 (Can.).
206. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, at para. 644 (emphasis added).
207. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, at para. 124
(May 21, 1999).
208. It is to be noted that other Trial Chambers refrain from imposing the burden of
proving a policy or plan as a general requirement of crimes against humanity but appear
to have taken cognisance of it as a means of proving systematicity. See Prosecutor v.
Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, at para. 203 (Mar. 3, 2000).
209. Prosecutor v Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1 -A, Judgment, at para. 98 (June 12,
2002).
provision which states: "It is understood that a 'policy to commit such
attack' requires that the State or organization actively promote or
encourage such an attack against any civilian population., 210  This
provision also has a footnote at its end which states: "[A] policy which
has a civilian population as the object of the attack would be implemented
by State or organizational action. Such a policy may, in exceptional
circumstances, be implemented by a deliberate failure to take action,
which is consciously aimed at encouraging such attack .... ,,21 Accordingly,
not only is "active policy" of a State a requisite element to constitute the
policy element under "crimes against humanity," but also its failure to act
in order to suppress such attack. The "action" requirement was included to
address the concern that a policy (and therefore an "attack") should not
be inferred simply from a State's failure to act, where there may be
innocent reasons for the inaction and where there is in fact no underlying
policy to encourage crimes.
212
As a result of the progressive evolution of customary international law
it is no longer required that the policy is the policy of a State. The 1996
ILC Draft Code contains a requirement that in order to constitute a
"crime against humanity" the enumerated acts must be "instigated or
directed by a Government or by any organization or group. 213 In Tadic,
the Trial Chamber considered that at the present stage of customary
international law, "the law in relation to crimes against humanity has
developed to take into account forces which although not those of the
legitimate government, have de facto control over, or are able to move
freely within, defined territory. 21 4 Accordingly, the policy element may
be attributed either to a State or to a governmental organization or to an
210. U.N. Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Criminal Court, supra note 10, at 9.
211. Id. atn.6.
212. Darryl Robinson, The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE 74-76 (Roy S. Lee et al. eds., 2001).
213. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth
Session, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 95-96, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
The commentary on Article 18 of the 1996 Draft Code clarifies this issue: "this
alternative is intended to exclude the situation in which an individual commits an
inhumane acts while acting on his own initiative pursuant to his own criminal plan in the
absence of any encouragement or direction from either a Government or a group or
organization. This type of isolated criminal conduct on the part of a single individual
would not constitute crime against humanity. . . . The instigation or direction of a
Government or any organization or group, which may not be affiliated with a
Government, gives the act its great dimension and makes it as a crime against humanity
imputable to private persons or agents of a State."
214. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, at para. 654. It should be noted that in Article 2 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY, the term "State" is defined as: "A
State Member or non-member of the United Nations or a self-proclaimed entity defacto
exercising governmental functions, whether recognized as a State or not."
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entity which exercise defacto authority over a territory. Likewise, in the
Kupreskic case, the Trial Chamber held that such a policy does not have
to be "explicitly formulated nor need it be the policy of a State" in order
to fulfill the "systematic" aspect of an attack.2'
Importantly, such a policy need not be formalized and can be deduced
from the way in which the acts occur.216 That is to say, the policy
element should be a flexible test, of a lower threshold than the term
"systematic," which needs a much more rigorous test.217 Yet, one might
conclude that the recognition of the policy element does not reintroduce
"systematic" as a mandatory requirement in all cases.
It also can be questioned whether there must be a link between the
perpetrator of a "crime against humanity" and the organization behind
the policy, or whether the offence must be committed by organs of a
State (or governmental authority), and whether it may be perpetrated by
individuals not acting in an official capacity. The case law of the ICTY
considers these points. In the Kupreskic case, the Trial Chamber held
that:
While crimes against humanity are normally perpetrated by State organs, i.e.,
individuals acting in an official capacity such as military commanders,
serviceman, etc., there may be cases where the authors of such crimes are
individuals having neither official status nor acting on behalf of a governmental
authority. The available case-law seems to indicate that in these cases some sort
of explicit or implicit approval or endorsement by State or governmental
authorities is required, or else that it is necessary for the offence to be clearly
encoura ed by a general governmental policy or to clearly fit within such a
policy.2
8
An accused may be held responsible for committing "crimes against
humanity" irrespective of whether he "has taken part in the formulation
of a discriminatory policy or practice by the governmental authority.
21 9
Perpetrators of crimes against humanity can therefore be individuals
"having neither official status nor acting on behalf of a governmental
authority. '220 The Weller case may prove to be of some relevance to this
215. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, at para. 551 (Jan.
14, 2000).
216. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-T, at para. 653.
217. The "systematic" requirement poses a very stringent test, involving not only an
underlying "policy," but also highly organized and orchestrated execution of those acts
in accordance with a developed plan.
218. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, at para.555.
219. Id. at para. 625
220. Id. at para. 555.
issue.221 "This case gave rise to six different judgments by German courts
after World War II and involved the ill-treatment of Jewish civilians by
two persons under the command of Weller, a member of the SS, who
was at the time not in uniform and was acting on his own initiative. On
appeal to the Supreme Court for the British zone, it was held that the
offence did indeed constitute a crime against humanity, on the grounds
that it was sufficient for the attack on human dignity to be connected to
the national-socialist system of power and hegemony."
222
Another central concern is that Article 7(2)(a) of the ICC Statute
defines the phrase "attack directed against any civilian population" to
mean a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts
referred to in Article 7(1). The prosecution must establish the existence
of an "attack directed against any civilian population," i.e., multiple
inhumane acts in furtherance of a policy, and prove that this attack was
either widespread (involving a very large number of victims) or
systematic (involving a very high degree of orchestration).223 Thus, if
the prosecutor chooses to prove the "widespread" element, the concern
about completely unrelated acts is addressed, because of the policy
element. If the prosecutor chooses to prove the "systematic" element,
some element of scale must still be shown before ICC jurisdiction is
warranted, because a course of conduct involving multiple commissions
of acts is required.224
In sum, while the requirements are disjunctive, an evidentiary overlap
may arise in the proof of the "widespread or systematic" requirement.
The fact that an attack was widespread could itself be evidence of the
systematic nature of the attack.225 Indeed, in practice, these two criteria
will often be difficult to separate since a widespread attack targeting a
large number of victims generally relies on some form of planning or
226
organization.
F. Mens rea "The Accused had Knowledge of the Wider Context in
Which His or Her Conduct Occurs"
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute and Article 3 of the ICTR Statute lack a
221. The Weller case (unpublished), quoted in. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, at
para. 555.
222. Id.
223. Robinson, supra note 109, at 163-64.
224. Darryl Robinson, Defining "Crimes Against Humanity" at The Rome
Conference, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 49-51 (1999).
225. See generally Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, at para. 53
(Dec. 14, 1999).
226. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T Judgment, at para. 207 (Mar. 3,
2000).
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provision which determine the nature of the mens rea of a "crime against
humanity." However, Article 7 of the ICC Statute does provide that
criminal acts must be perpetrated "in the knowledge" of the widespread
or systematic attack.227 In other words, the Rome Statute does not
require that the accused's knowledge encompass the required nexus
between his conduct and the attack against the civilian population, only
that there existed an attack.228
In order to satisfy the requisite mens rea of the accused under "crimes
against humanity," three important aspects of this mental element must
be examined. First, the accused must have knowledge of the general
context in which his acts occur and then of the nexus between his action
and that context.229 National and international case law supports this
first aspect. In Tadic, the Trial Chamber held that "the perpetrator must
know of the broader context in which his act occurs.' The former
judgement relies in particular on the Decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Regina v. Finta.23' It is also based upon the decision rendered
by the ICTR Trial Chamber hearing the Kayishema and Ruzindana case
which considered that the mens rea contained two parts; that is, (1)
knowledge of the attack and its widespread or systematic character and
(2) awareness of the fact that the criminal activity constitutes part of the
attack.232 The Rwanda Tribunal wrote: "to be guilty of crimes against
humanity the perpetrator must know that there is an attack on a civilian
population and that his act is part of the attack.,
233
227. According to the Tadic Appeal Judgement, "Article 7(1) of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court thus articulates a definition of crimes against humanity
based solely upon the interplay between the mens rea of the defendant and the existence
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population." Prosecutor
v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-A, Judgment, at para. 291 n.354 (July 15, 1999).
228. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 8, at art. 30.
According to the ICC Statute, "knowledge means awareness that a circumstance exists or
a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events."
229. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, at para. 247.
230. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-l-T, Opinion and Judgment, at para. 656
(May 7,1997).
231. R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 820 (Can.).
232. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-I-T, Judgment, at para. 133
(May 21, 1999).
233. Id. The Trial Chamber held that "part of what transforms an individual's act
into a crime against humanity is the inclusion of the act within a greater dimension of
criminal conduct; therefore an accused should be aware of this greater dimension in
order to be culpable thereof. Accordingly, actual or constructive knowledge of the
broader context of the attack, meaning that the accused must know that his act is part of
a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population and pursuant to some kind of
Likewise, the Appeal Chamber, in Tadic expressly recognises that "the
acts of the accused must comprise part of a pattern of widespread or
systematic attack directed against a civilian population and that the
accused must have known that his acts fit into such pattern. 234
Knowledge of the attack and its widespread or systematic character, or
of "the broader context in which the acts occurs," should not be confused
with knowledge that this amounts to "crimes against humanity" as a
question of law. An accused cannot answer that while being aware of the
fact that his or her criminal activity constitutes part of the attack, he or
she was not aware that this met the definition of "crimes against
humanity.,, 235 The judgement of the Canadian Supreme Court in the
Finta case is illustrative of this matter:
However, it would not be necessary to establish that the accused knew that his
or her actions were inhumane. For example, if the jury was satisfied that Finta
was aware of the conditions within the boxcars [in which the Jews were
deported] that would be sufficient to convict him for crimes against humanity
even though he did not know that his action in loading the people into those
boxcars were inhumane.
236
The second aspect of the mens rea is "knowing participation in the
context." Addressing this point, the Yugoslav Tribunal ruled that: "the
accused need not have sought all the elements of the context in which
his acts were perpetrated, it suffices that, through the functions he
willingly accepted, he knowingly took the risk of participating in the
implementation of that context. ' 237  Accordingly, negligence is not a
sufficient mental state to hold a person guilty of crimes against humanity.
Generally speaking, the gravity and the scale of "crimes against
humanity" ordinarily leads to the presumption that several protagonists
were involved in its perpetration.238 It has been proposed that a distinction
should be made in the formulation of the crime itself regarding the
sufficient intent and knowledge required for each participant in the
criminal enterprise. 239 That is to say, general intent should be required
policy or plan, is necessary to satisfy the requisite mens rea element of the accused." See
id. at para. 134.
234. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, at para. 248.
235. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 8, at art.
32(2): "A mistake of law as to whether a particular type of conduct is a crime within the
jurisdiction of the court shall not be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility. A
mistake of law may, however, be ground for excluding criminal responsibility if it
negates the mental element required by such a crime, or as provided for article 33."
236. R. v. Finta, I S.C.R. at 820 (Can.). See also Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-T, at
para. 657.
237. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, at para. 251.
238. BASS]OUNI, supra note 15, at 209. Those protagonists may be categorized as
follows: policy makers and senior executors; mid-level facilitators; low-level executors.
239. Id. Prof. Bassiouni proposed that general intent should be required with
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with respect to the senior executors and policy makers, while specific
intent should be required with respect to the low level executors.
24P
One might disagree with the above proposal for two reasons. First,
according to the requirement of specific intent, the prosecution not only
must prove that the accused had the intent to commit the underlying
offence and that he or she had awareness of the "broader context in
which his or her acts occurs" but also he must prove the specific intent
of the accused "low level executor." That is, the Prosecution must
demonstrate that the accused had a particularly racist or inhumane frame
of mind, or that he or she personally shared the goals of the attack
against the civilian population. It may be difficult to affirmatively prove
that an accused consciously desired the promotion of the regime and this
would run the risk of enquiring into the accused's motives, which are
irrelevant. In addressing this point the Appeals Chamber, in Tadic,
made it clear that the motive of the accused for taking part in the attack
is irrelevant and that a crime against humanity may be committed for
241purely personal reasons.
With regard to the requirement of "specific knowledge," the case law
opposes this proposal. As evidenced by the judgement of the ICTY, the
mens rea specific to a "crime against humanity" does not require that the
agent be linked to the ideology, policy or plan in whose name mass
crimes were perpetrated nor even that he supported it. Rather, "[i]t suffices
that he knowingly took the risk of participating in the implementation of
the ideology, policy or plan. 242 As the Trial Chamber in the Blaskic
case has already asserted:
The person who has "knowledge" of the plan, policy or organisation as part of
which the crimes take place is not only the one who fully supports it but also the
one who, through the political or military functions which he willingly
performed and which resulted in his periodic collaboration with the authors of
the plan, policy or organisation and in his participation in its execution,
implicitly accepted the context in which his functions, collaboration and
participation must most probably have fit. 243
respect to the former two categories, while specific intent which is more difficult to be
proved, should be required with respect of the latter category. That is to say, it is
reasonable to assume that policy makers and senior executors have more access to
information and more knowledge of the attack than those at the lower levels of the
echelon of command.
240. Id.
241. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, at paras. 248, 252; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case
Nos. IT-96-23-T, IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, at para. 433 (Feb. 22, 2001).
242. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, at para. 257.
243. Id. at para. 255.
In the Papon case, the French Cour de Cassation confirmed this approach and
maintained that Article 6 of the Nuremberg Statute did not require that an aider
and abettor to a crime against humanity necessarily support the policy set by the
principal perpetrators. The Criminal Chamber of the Court stated: "the last
paragraph of Article 6 of the International Military Tribunal . . . does not require
that the accomplice to a crime against humanity support the policy of
ideological hegemony of the principal perpetrator...."244
In addition, Darryl Robinson observed that the obligation to prove all
mental elements of the crime does not impose a significant burden on the
Prosecution. He added, "[g]iven the inescapable notoriety of a widespread
or systematic attack against a civilian population, it is unlikely that an
accused could commit an inhumane act as part of such attack, while




The Krnojelac Trial Chamber adopts the same language providing that
it is sufficient for the conviction of crimes against humanity that the
perpetrator through his acts or the function which he willingly accepted,
he knowingly took the risk of participating in the implantation of that
attack.246
The third aspect of the mens rea is "the evidence" or the test which the
Court should follow in order to prove the "knowledge" of the accused.
As evidenced by the case law of the two ad hoc Tribunals, "knowledge
of the attack" can be actual or constructive.247 It may be inferred from a
concurrence of concrete facts, such as the historical and political
circumstances in which the acts occurred, the scope and gravity of the
acts perpetrated, or the nature of the crimes committed and the degree to
which they are common knowledge.248 Yet, the important distinction,
which has implications with respect of to the policy of deterrence, would
be left to the determination of the judicial body adjudicating a given
case.
249
Moreover, in addition to the intent to commit the underlying offence,
the perpetrator needs to know that there is an attack on the civilian
population and that his acts comprise part of the attack, or at least to take
the risk that his acts are part of the attack. This, however, does not entail
knowledge of the details of the attack.250 The Kunarac Trial Judgment
observes that the "Prosecution does not need to prove that the accused
244. Id. at para. 256.
245. Robinson, supra note 109, at 165.
246. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment, at para. 59 (Mar. 15,
2002).
247. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, at para. 659; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No.
IT-95-16-T, Judgment, at para. 557 (Jan 14, 2000); and Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case
No. ICTR-95-I-T, Judgment, at para. 134 (May 21, 1999).
248. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, at para. 259.
249. Id. at para. 258.
250. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T, IT-96-23/I-T, at paras. 433-35.
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chose his victims for their civilian status.... The Prosecution must show
that the perpetrator could not reasonably have believed that the victim
was a member of the armed forces."25'
Given the fact that the provision of crimes against humanity provides
that the attack should be directed against a "civilian" population, it might
be questioned whether the Prosecution should have to prove that the
accused chose his victims for their civilian statutes. Addressing this
point, the Trial Chamber in Kunarac ruled that "in case of doubt as to
whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be
civilian.., and the Prosecution must show that the perpetrator could not
reasonably have believed that the victim was a member of armed
forces.' 25
It might perhaps be argued whether a lower threshold of mental state
is sufficient to hold the accused criminally responsible and liable for
crimes against humanity. However, although the submissions of the
OTP have not yet included the lower threshold of taking the risk that
one's act is part of the attack; the Blaski Trial Chamber provided that the
mental state requirement of Article 5 is satisfied if an accused
"knowingly took the risk of participating in the implementation of that
context." 25 He "need not have sought all the elements of the context in
,,254which his acts were perpetrated. The Chamber provided that proof is
not required that "the agent had the intent to support the regime or the
full and absolute intent to acts as its intermediary so long as proof of the
existence of direct and indirect malicious intent or recklessness is
provided., 255 All in all, the mens rea requirement is a fundamental principle
for the potential offender. To find him guilty, the prosecution has to
prove that the accused has actual or constructive knowledge of the
broader context of the attack, meaning that the accused must know that
his acts were part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian
population, and he did not commit his act for purely personal motives
completely unrelated to the attack on the civilian population.256 For
example, he could have the mens rea for ordinary murder as a crime
251. Id. at para. 435.
252. Id.
253. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, at para. 251.
254. Id.
255. Id. at para. 254. See also paras. 255, 257.
256. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, at para. 659; Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T,
at para. 134; Prosecutor v Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, at para. 71
(Dec. 6, 1999).
under national jurisdiction, but not for murder as a crime against humanity.
Thus, in this category of international crimes the subjective element or
the mens rea of the alleged offender is the decisive component in
determining whether or not the accused's conduct satisfied the threshold
of such international crime. This issue will be discussed in detail while
examining the objective and the subjective elements of persecution as a
crime against humanity.
IV. THE ACTUS REUS AND THE MENS REA OF PERSECUTION
Having examined and evaluated the general requirements of "crimes
against humanity," this part of the paper will examine the international
case law on the objective and subjective elements of persecution as a
crime against humanity.257
Unfortunately, although often used, the term has never been precisely
defined in international criminal law, nor is "persecution" known as such
in the world's major criminal justice systems. In his attempts to fill
this definitional lacuna Prof. Bassiouni wrote: "[t]hroughout history, the
terms 'persecute' and 'persecution' have come to be understood to refer
to discriminatory practices resulting in physical or mental harm, economic
harm, or all of the above., 25 9 He also observed that the words "persecute"
and the act of "persecution" have come to acquire a universally accepted
meaning for which a proposed definition is:
State action or policy leading to the infliction upon an individual of harassment,
torment, oppression, or discriminatory measures, designed to or likely to
produce physical or mental suffering or economic harm, because of the victim's
beliefs, views, or membership in a given identifiable group (religious, social,
ethnic, linguistic etc.), or simply because the perpetrator sought to single out a
given category of victims for reasons peculiar to the perpetrator.260
A general definition of "persecution" was originally offered for "crimes
against humanity" in the Barbie case where M. Le Gunehec of the Cour
de Cassation wrote:
Above all these crimes offend the fundamental rights of mankind; the right to
equality, without distinctions of race, colour or nationality, and the right to hold
257. The term "persecution" within the meaning of "crimes against humanity" first
appears in the drafting of the Nuremberg Charter, in which Justice Robert H. Jackson
proposed to supplement the punishment of those who contravened the laws, rules, and
customs of land and naval warfare with a separate provision prohibiting "atrocities and
offences, including atrocities and persecutions on racial or religious grounds, committed
since 1933." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT OF JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON: U.S. REP.
To THE INT'L CONF. ON MILITARY TRIALS 50 (1949).
258. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-T, Opinion and Judgment, at para. 694(May 7, 1997), citing BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 318.
259. BASSIOUNI, supra note 15, at 326-27.
260. Id. at 327.
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one's own political and religious opinions. Such crimes not only inflict wounds
or death, but are aggravated by the voluntary, deliberate and gratuitous violation
of the dignity of all men and women: these are victimised only because they
belong to a group other than that of their persecutors, or do not accept their
dominion.
261
Judge Cassese observes that the above definition is "both acceptable
and effective, so long as we take it in its broader meaning. ' 262 He continues,
"it must be interpreted as also covering inhumane acts directed against
enemy civilians not because they are Jewish, partisans or political opponents
but only because they belong to the enemy." 263 However, the Charter of
the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR all
sanction "persecutions" on political, racial and religious grounds under
"crimes against humanity," none define this sub-characterisation, or state
which forms it may take. Notwithstanding, "persecution" is broadly
defined under the ICC Statute; it is however restricted to acts perpetrated
"in connection" with any of the enumerated acts under Article 7(1) of
the Statute (i.e. murder, extermination, enslavement, etc.), or it has to be
committed together with another crimes within the jurisdiction of the
ICC (i.e. genocide, war crimes, or aggression). 264 Furthermore, neither
national nor international case law provides an authoritative single
definition of what constitutes "persecution.' 265
261. Report of Councellor Le Gunehec, quoted in Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-T, at
para. 696.
262. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, at para. 696.
263. Id.
264. Article 7(1)(h) states: "Persecution against any identifiable group or
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognised as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court." ICC Statute, supra note 133. Article 7(2)(g) provides:
"'Persecution' means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights
contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity." ICC
Statute, supra note 133. For a commentary of Article 7(l)(h) and (2)(g), see Machteld
Boot & Christopher K. Hall, Persecution, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 146, 146-48 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
265. Persecution has, since Nuremberg, been understood to involve acts which may
not be violent or even severe standing alone, but, when taken together and in light of the
fact that they are targeted against a particular group, amount to a "crime against
humanity." For example, the persecution of the Jews under Nazi Germany involved a
progression of violation of rights, starting with the deprivation of rights of citizenship
and economic and property rights, and then leading to arrest and confinement in
concentration camps, torture, deportations, slave labour and finally murder. It was not
necessary that the rights infringed at the earlier stages of the persecution were
"universally recognized" or even that they were fundamental violations of international
law. Rather, persecution was proven by showing deprivation of rights accorded under
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The Trial Chambers in Tadi6, Kupreski6, Blaski6, and Kordi6 recognized
that the international crime of persecutions has never been comprehensively
defined:
266
Neither international treaty law nor case law provides a comprehensive list of
illegal acts encompassed by the charge of persecution, and persecution as such
is not known in the world's major criminal justice systems.267 The Trial
Chamber agrees with the Defence that the crime of persecution needs careful
and sensitive development in light of the principle of nullum crimen sine
lege.268
Hence, in the absence of a consistent and uniform definition of
"persecution," the term may well be open-ended, and consequently,
infringe the principles of nullum crimen sine lege and non-retroactivity
of criminal law. In addition, the ambiguity of the actus reus and the
mens rea of "persecution" as a "crime against humanity" may place the
term in a grey area where both "crimes against humanity" and
"genocide" overlap.269
The purpose of this part is to dissipate the present confusion, to
analyze and examine the evolutionary development of the term following
the case law270 where the term raises significant questions: must the
"crime of persecution" as a category of crimes against humanity be
linked to other acts enumerated in these Statutes or it can stand alone?
Could this crime include other acts not specifically listed therein? What
are the actus reus and mens rea of the crime of persecution? Is there a
precise definition of this crime?
national law. It is sufficient that there be consensus among states that the rights are
fundamental.
266. Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, at para. 192 (Feb. 26,
2001).
267. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-T, Opinion and Judgment, at para. 694
(May 7, 1997).
268. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, at para. 192.
269. In this regard, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNi, The Normative Framework of
International Humanitarian Law: Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities, in I INT'L CRIMINAL
LAW 617, 618 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999); See Schabas, supra note 29, at 10-
12, 252-56; William A. Schabas The Crime of Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
447, 460-61 (Hort Fischer et al. eds., 2001).
270. The most important sources available to date on the definition of Article 5(h)
are the discussions of persecution. See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T,
Judgment, at paras. 567-636 (Jan.14, 2000); Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, at paras.
188-220; at paras. 184-205 of the Miroslav Kvocka et al., (see note 303 infra); and
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment, at paras. 431-36 (Mar. 15,
2002). Although these discussions are only by Trial Chambers, not the Appeals Chamber,
and they represent to a certain extent obitur dictum, they are the most elaborate and
coherent presentations of the elements of persecutions in international case-law.
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A. The Objective Element or the "Actus Reus" of Persecution
Unlike the sub-characterization of murder within the meaning of crimes
against humanity which represents only one crime, that of "persecution"
may assume several different criminal forms.27 1 According to the Tadic
judgment, an act of persecution or omission can be of varying severity,
"from killing to a limitation on the type of professions open to the
targeted group." 272 Thus, it is clear that "persecution" may take diverse
forms, and does not necessarily require a physical element.
The lack of definition of the specified acts which may constitute a
crime of persecution emphasises the need to identify the actus reus of
this offense.
1. The Nexus Requirement
A preliminary question confronting the actus reus of the crime of
persecution provided for in the three Statutes under consideration is
whether this crime must be criminalized only in connection with another
crime within the jurisdiction of these Statutes or if it may stand alone.
Addressing this point, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Kordic and Cerkez
concurred with the Kupreskic decision that the actus reus for persecution
requires no link to crimes enumerated elsewhere in the Statute, and
found that, consonant with customary international law, the crime of
persecution may indeed encompass crimes not enumerated elsewhere in
the Statute.
274
271. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, at para. 218 (Mar. 3,
2000).
272. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, at paras. 694,
704 (May 7, 1997).
273. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, at para. 568. In Tadic Opinion and
Judgement the Trial Chamber held that "persecution can take numerous forms, so as long
as the common element of discrimination in regard to the enjoyment of a basic
fundamental right is present, and persecution does not necessarily require a physical
element." Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1 -T, at para. 707. Other example mentioned as acts of
persecution include those of an economic and judicial nature. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-
T, at para. 710.
274. Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T,
Judgment, Feb. 26, 2001, at paras. 193-94. In this regard the Trial Chamber in
Kupreskic case held that "an examination of customary international law indicates that as
customary rules on crimes against humanity gradually crystallised after 1945, the link
between crimes against humanity and war crimes disappeared. This is evidenced by; (a)
the relevant provision of Control Council Law No. 10, which omitted this qualification;
(b) national legislation (such as the Canadian and the French laws); (c) case-law; (d)
Although, the jurisprudence of the Yugoslav Tribunal thus far appears
to have accepted that customary international law no longer requires a
link between the crime of persecution and any other crimes enumerated
elsewhere in the Statute, the text of Article 7(1)(h) of the ICC Statute
deviates from this passage by requiring that the occurrence of this
offence must be in connection with other crimes in the jurisdiction of the
ICC.275 This requirement is confirmed in the draft text of the Elements
of Crimes adopted by the Preparatory Commission.276 To the extent that
it is required that persecution be connected with war crimes or the crime
of aggression, this requirement is especially striking, in light of the fact
that the Statute of the ICC reflects customary international law in
abolishing the nexus between crimes against humanity and armed
conflict.277 This restriction poses a rigid limitation on the prosecution of
"persecutory acts" that may occur before the commencement or preparation
of the other crimes.278 For example, the case of racial laws modelled on
Nazi/Fascist regimes' laws discriminating against Jewish people would
not be punishable under the jurisprudence of the ICC unless another
crime is proved.279
Given that this provision (the requisite link between persecution and
other crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC) appears not to be
consonant with customary international law, this restriction might be
easily circumvented for two reasons. First, Article 10 of the Rome
such international treaties as the Convention on Genocide of 1948, the Convention on the
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
of 1968, and the Convention on Apartheid of 1973; and (e) the prior jurisprudence of the
International Tribunal. This evolution thus evidences the gradual abandonment of the
nexus between crimes against humanity and war crimes." Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-
16-T, at para. 577.
275. For the text of Article 7(l)(h) see ICC Statute, supra note 264. It should be
noted that the delegations at the Preparatory Commission of the ICC were divided over
whether "persecution" could occur in the absence of other crimes. Some delegations
noted that the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters required that persecution be committed in
connection with war crimes or crimes against peace. These delegations insisted on such
a "connection requirement," to avoid a sweeping interpretation criminalizing all
discriminatory practices. Other delegations resisted a "connection requirement," which
did not appear in instruments such as CCL No. 10, the ILC Draft Codes, or the ICTY or
ICTR Statutes. Finally, a compromise was reached requiring a connection between the
persecutory acts and any other crime within the Jurisdiction of the Court "or any act
referred to in paragraph 1."
276. U.N. Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Criminal Court, supra note 10, at 15.
Element 4 of crime against humanity of persecution reads as follows: "[t]he conduct was
committed in connection with any act referred to in article 7, paragraph I, of the Statute
or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court."
277. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, at para. 580.
278. Donnat-Cattin, supra note 125, at 72-73.
279. Id. See also, Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes within the
Jurisdiction of the Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE
ROME STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, AND RESULTS 79, 101-02 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
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Statute states that "Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law
for purposes other than this Statute., 280 This provision clearly conveys
the idea that the framers of the Statute did not intend to affect, amongst
other things, lex lata as regards such matters as the definition of war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.28' Thus, the issue should
not be insurmountable, since Article 10 provides a good safeguard.
Second, although the Statute of the ICC limits persecution to acts
performed in connection with other crimes falling within its jurisdiction,
in practice the list of acts which may potentially be characterised as
persecution is extensive in view of the broad range of crimes listed
thereunder.282 Furthermore, the possibility of connection to "other inhumane
acts" as provided for in Article 7(1)(k) ensures that persecution will not
be a mere auxiliary offense or aggravating factor. Moreover, it is to be
noted that this connection requirement ensures that it is not necessary to
demonstrate that the connected inhumane acts were committed on a
widespread or systematic basis; it will suffice to show a connection
between the persecution and any instance of murder, torture, rape,
deportation or "other inhumane acts," which need not be committed on a
widespread or systematic basis.283
2. Types of Persecution
From the above, it is evident that the essential difference between the
actus reus of persecution provided for in the Statutes of the two ad hoc
Tribunals and that of the ICC is that the former requires no link between
the actus reus of persecution and other acts or crimes enumerated
280. For an extensive interpretation of Article 10 of the ICC, see Fenrick, supra
note 111, at 315-32.
281. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, at para. 580.
282. Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, at para. 197 (Feb. 26,
2001). See ICC Statute, supra note 133, at arts. 6-8. Paragraph I of Article 7, entitled
"Crimes against humanity", sets out the following acts: (a) murder; (b) extermination; (c)
enslavement; (d) deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) imprisonment or other
severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international
law; (f) torture; (g) rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h)
persecution; (i) enforced disappearance of persons; (j) apartheid; (k) other inhumane acts
of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or
mental or physical health. A number of these enumerated crimes are not listed in the
Statutes of the two ad hoc Tribunals.
283. von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 279, at 101-02.
elsewhere in the Statute, while the latter does.284 The jurisdiction of the
ICC over persecution is clearly limited to specific acts or crimes within
its Statute which comply with the principle of legality, while under the
Statutes of the two ad hoc Tribunals there are no clearly defined limits
on the expansion of the types of acts which qualify as persecution.
Thus, the issue under the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR is problematic,
and raises the question of what types of acts, aside from other categories
of crimes against humanity, may be deemed to constitute persecution
under these Statutes.
In an attempt to catalogue the scope of persecutory acts within the
meaning of "crimes against humanity" the ILC notes that these acts
include:
A prohibition on practicing certain kind of religious worship; prolonged and
systematic detention of individuals who present a political, religious or cultural
group; a prohibition on the use of a national language, even in private;
systematic destruction of monuments or buildings representative of a particular
social, religious, cultural or other group. Such acts would come within the
scope of this Article when committed in a systematic manner or on a mass
scale. 2
85
In the 1996 Draft Code this enumeration was replaced with a
recognition that "the inhumane act of persecution may take many forms
with its common characteristic being the denial of the human rights and
fundamental freedoms to which every individual is entitled without
distinction, as recognised in the Charter of the United Nations (Articles 1
and 55), and the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights
(Article 2). "286
The Judgment of the IMT considered the following acts, amongst
others, in its finding of persecution: the passing of discriminatory laws;
the exclusion of members of an ethnic or religious group from aspects of
social, political, and economic life; and the creation of ghettos.
28 7
Examining the persecution of the Jews, the IMT thus noted inter alia
that: "[T]he persecution of the Jews at the hand of the Nazi Government
has been proved in the greatest detail before the Tribunal. It is a record
of consistent and systematic inhumanity on the greatest scale . ,,28s
284. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, at para. 581; Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T,
at paras. 193-94.
285. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-third
Session, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 236, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991).
286. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR., 48th Sess., Supp.
No. 10, at 98, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc
/reports/1 996/96repfra.htm.
287. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major
War Criminals, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/judwarcr.htm.
288. Id.
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Recalling the anti-Jewish policy as formulated in Point 4 of the Programme
of the Nazi party of 24 February 1920,289 and examining in great detail
acts committed long before 1939, the Tribunal wrote:
With the seizure of power, the persecution of the Jews was intensified. A series
of discriminatory laws were passed, which limited the offices and professions
permitted to Jews; and restrictions were placed on their family life and their
rights to citizen ship .... Programs were organised, which included the burning
and demolishing of synagogues, the looting of Jewish business .... A collective
fine of one billion marks was imposed on the Jews, the seizure of Jewish assets
was authorised and the movement of Jews was restricted by regulations to
certain specified districts and hours. The creation of ghettoes was carried out on
an extensive scale, and by an order of the Security Police Jews were compelled
to wear a yellow star to be worn on the breast and back.29
6
Furthermore, the Nurembeig Tribunal found Gbring guilty of crimes
against humanity, in particular, for being "[T]he active authority in the
spoliation of conquered territory" and for having imposed the fine of a
billion Reich marks on the Jews.291 The Rebuttal statement of the Prosecution
before the Nuremberg Tribunal has been interpreted to include economic
deprivation of this more personal type, and the finding of the Nuremberg
Tribunal characterising certain acts of economic discrimination as
persecution support the conclusion that economic measures of a personal,
as opposed to an industrial type, can constitute persecutory acts.
29 2
In addition to economic measures a variety of other acts can constitute
persecution if done with the requisite discriminatory intent. The trial of
Streicher before the Nuremberg Tribunal is useful in considering the
varying manifestations of persecutory acts.293  Streicher was convicted
of crimes against humanity because through his speaking, writing and
preaching hatred of the Jews he "injected into the mind of thousands of
Germans which caused them to follow the National Socialists policy of
289. The Anti-Jewish policy was formulated in Point 4 of the "Party Programme"
which declared "Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the race can
only be one who is of German blood, without consideration of creed. Consequently, no
Jew can be a member of the race."
290. Judgement of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German
Major War Criminals, supra note 287.
291. Judgement of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German
Major War Criminals, (G6ring Case), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon
/imt/proc/judgoeri.htm.
292. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, at para.707
(May 7, 1997).
293. See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German
Major War Criminals (Streicher Case), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon
/imt/proc/judstrei.htm.
Jewish persecution and extermination" in Germany as well as elsewhere.
Thus his "incitement to murder and extermination at the time when Jews
in the East were being killed under the most horrible conditions clearly
constitutes persecution on political and racial grounds in connection with
War Crimes as defined in the Charter and constitutes a Crime Against
Humanity.29
4
It is also clear that some courts have used the term persecution to
describe acts other than those enumerated in the Statutes of the two ad
hoc Tribunals. In the line of the Nuremberg Judgement, the U.S. Military
Tribunal in the Justice case held that the national pattern or plan for
racial persecution was one of actual extermination of Jewish and Polish
people, but that "lesser forms of racial persecution were universally
practiced by governmental authority and constituted an integral part in
the general policy of the Reich. 295 In summary, what was considered to
be persecution in the Justice case was the use of a legal system to
implement a discriminatory policy.
Recent judgements of the ICTY show that the crime of "persecution"
encompasses not only bodily and mental harm and infringements upon
individual freedom but also acts which appear less serious, such as those
targeting property, so long as the victimised persons were specially
selected on grounds linked to their belonging to a particular community. 2 %
Convicting Kordic and Cerkez of crimes against humanity, the Tribunal
said that the acts must reach a similar level of gravity as the other
offences enumerated in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute in order to constitute
the crime of persecution.297
In its definition of the actus reus of persecution the Trial Chamber of
the ICTY set forth a four-part test in which an act of persecution is
constituted by a gross or blatant denial; on discriminatory grounds; of a
fundamental right, laid down in international customary or treaty law;
reaching the same level of gravity as the other crimes against humanity
enumerated in Article 5 of the Statute.298 This holding was further
294. Id.
295. United States. v. Altstoetter, in 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 1063 (1951)
[hereinafter The Justice Case].
296. Prosecutor v. Blaskic,Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, para. 218, 233 (Mar. 3,
2000).
297. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, at para. 195.
298. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, at para. 621; Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T,
at para. 195. In its commentary to Article 18(e) of the 1996 Draft Code, the ILC
formulated persecution as a "denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms". Draft
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Commentary to art. 18, at
para. 11, in Report of the Int'l Law Comm'n on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session,
U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcodefra.htm.
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reinforced in the Krnojelac Trial Judgment. 299 However, according to the
prosecution, such a restrictive holding would exclude certain acts from
the scope of the crime of persecution, such as certain property destruction,
and dismissal from employment, that do not necessarily rise, in and of
themselves, to the level of inhumane acts prescribed under Articles 5 of
the ICTY Statute.
In a recent case before the Yugoslav Tribunal, the accused, Milomir
Stakic, was indicted for his participation in a persecutorial campaign
which included the denial of fundamental rights to Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats, including the right to employment, freedom of movement,
right to proper judicial process or right to proper medical care. 300 The
prosecution submitted that these rights are fundamental rights and
violations thereof amount to persecutions. 30 1 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber
observed that these extensive numbers of persecutory acts were proved,
and pointed to a comprehensive picture of persecutions.
302
In addition, the Yugoslav Tribunal emphasised the unique nature of
the crime of persecution as a crime of cumulative effect. The Tribunal
wrote: "acts of persecution must be evaluated not in isolation but in
context, by looking at their cumulative effect. Although individual acts
may not be inhumane, their overall consequences must offend humanity
in such way that may be termed 'inhumane.'
30 3
Although a comprehensive list of acts which may constitute persecutions
has never been established,3°4 those acts which the Yugoslav Tribunal
has found may constitute persecutions include: participation in "the
seizure, collection, segregation and forced transfer of civilians to camps,
calling-out of civilians, beatings and killings; ' 305 "murder, imprisonment,
and deportation;" such attacks on propel as would constitute "a destruction
of the livelihood of a certain population;"06 the causing of the "humanitarian
299. See Prosecutor v. Kmojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, at para. 434
(Mar. 15, 2002).
300. Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, at para. 306 (July 31,
2003).
301. Id. at para. 770.
302. Id. at para. 817.
303. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T at para. 199.
304. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T at para. 443.
305. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, at para. 717
(May 7, 1997).
306. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, at paras. 628-31. There is clear support in
the case law of the ICTY for the inclusion of property violations in the actus reus of
persecutions under Article 5 (h). In Blaskic, the Trial Chamber held that: the destruction
crisis in Potocari, the burning of homes in Srebrenica and Potocari, the
terrorisation of Bosnian Muslim civilians, in Potocari or in carefully
orchestrated mass scale executions, and the forcible transfer of the women,
children and elderly out of the territory controlled by the Bosnian
Serbs., 30 7 Also included are "harassment, humiliation, and psychological
trauma"; 30 8 the "destruction and plunder of property, unlawful detention
and the forcible transfer of civilians," murder and physical and mental
injury;309 constant humiliation and degradation; 3 0 and the destruction
and looting of residential and commercial properties.
311
3. A Proposed Understanding
In light of the above quoted judgments, the commentary of the ILC,
and the elaborate definition of persecution under the Statute of the ICC,
one can discern the following regarding the actus reus of persecution:
"The term 'persecutory' act can include acts enumerated elsewhere in
the Statute as well as acts not specifically enumerated therein but which
nevertheless amount to gross or blatant denials, on discriminatory
grounds, of the victim's fundamental rights guaranteed by international
law." 312
An act of persecution must result in a "deprivation of fundamental
rights contrary to international law." Such a deprivation should include
as a minimum rights which are regarded as so fundamental that no
derogation from these rights is permitted.31 3 The court will have the
of property must be construed to mean the destruction of towns, villages and other public
or private property belonging to a given civilian population or extensive devastation not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully, wantonly and discriminatorily.
In the same context, the plunder of property belonging to a particular population,
whether it be the property of private individuals or of state or "quasi-state" public
collectives. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, at para. 234.
307. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No.IT-98-33-T, Judgment, at para. 537 (Aug. 2,
2001).
308. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, at para. 192 (Nov. 2,
2001).
309. Blaskik, Case No. IT-95-14-T, at para. 234. See also paras. 218, 233.
310. Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, at paras. 807-08 (July
31, 2003).
311. Id. at paras. 809-10.
312. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, at para. 715
(May 7, 1997); See also Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, at para. 218; Prosecutor v.
Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, at para. 195 (Feb. 26, 2001); Krstic, Case No.
IT-98-33-T, at para. 535.
313. See General Comment adopted by the Human Rights Committee under Article
40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, No. 24, U.N. Human
Rights Comm., 52nd Sess., at para. 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.6 (1994). The
Human Rights Committee enumerated a list of rights included within the provisions of
the ICCPR which may not be the subject of reservations because these provisions
represent customary law. Most notably, almost all the rights and freedoms provided for
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flexibility to determine the cases before it, depending on the forms
which attacks on humanity may take. Keeping into consideration that
each case has to be examined on its merits.
The discriminatory acts charged as persecution must not be considered
in isolation, but in context by looking at their cumulative effect. Although
individual acts may not be inhumane, their overall consequences must
offend humanity in such a way that they may be termed "inhumane. 31 4
With regard to acts not specifically mentioned in the Statute, a
"violation of the right to equality in some serious fashion that infringes
on the enjoyment of a basic or fundamental right" may nevertheless
amount to persecution, irrespective of whether or not such acts are legal
under national law."
315
Persecution encompasses not only bodily and mental harm and
infringements upon individual freedom, but also acts which appear less
serious, such as those targeting property, so long as the victimised
persons were specially selected on grounds linked to their membership
in a particular community.
Taken in isolation, certain acts or omissions such as denial of
employment or evictions from property may not appear to rise to the level
of persecution. However, the composite pattern of less grave acts could
constitute a "gross or blatant denial" of fundamental rights, 16 and satisfy
the actus reus of persecution. The Krnojelac Trial Judgment observes,
"the acts must amount to persecution, though it is not required that each
alleged underlying act be regarded as a violation of international law." '317
B. The Subjective Element or the "Mens rea" of Persecution
Defining the appropriate mens rea for the crime of persecution is a
in the international human rights instruments, as well as in other regional human rights
instruments are subject to limitations and restrictions. These limitations on the rights and
freedoms of individuals are not arbitrary, but must meet three requirements. First, it
must be prescribed by law (the principal of legality); second, it must have justified one of
the specified legitimate aims pursued in the particular provision, and third, the limitation
in all circumstances must be necessary in a democratic society. See Mohamed Elewa
Badar, Basic Principles Governing Limitations on Individual Rights and Freedoms in
Human Rights Instruments, 7 INT'L J. HUMAN RTS. 63 (2003).
314. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, at para. 535; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No.
IT-95-16-T, Judgment, at para. 622 (Jan. 14, 2000).
315. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-l-T at paras. 697, 710; See Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-
16-T, at paras. 614-15.
316. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, at paras. 615, 619-20.
317. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, at para. 434.
complex task. It is unquestionable that the mens rea of persecution is
based on discriminatory grounds.3" 8 This discriminatory animus is an
essential ingredient of the mens rea of this offense, the sole category in
which discrimination comprises an integral element of prohibited conduct.
This heightened mens rea is precisely what distinguishes "persecution"
from other "crimes against humanity." In the three Statutes under
consideration the discriminatory intent relates solely to the grounds
pronounced therein.
1. Discriminatory Grounds
International instruments which include persecution as a crime against
humanity require that persecution be committed on one of several
enumerated grounds. The Nuremberg Charter included persecution "on
political, racial or religious grounds," as did CCL No. 10. In contrast,
the Tokyo Charter excluded persecution on religious grounds.3" 9 In the
1954 Draft Code, both crimes of the "murder" type and "persecution"
were included as "inhumane acts," which referred to "social, political,
racial, religious or cultural grounds." The Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide contains the additional
grounds of ethnicity, as do the 1991 and 1996 ILC Draft Code.
The ICTR Statute, in contrast to previous instruments, not only mentions
several grounds in the paragraph covering the crime of persecution
(political, racial or religious grounds) but also in the chapeau of the
Article covering crimes against humanity (national, political, ethnic,
racial or religious grounds). Under the ICTY Statute the mental element
of the crime of persecution consists of acting with discriminatory intent
on political, racial, and religious grounds. The use of the cumulative
318. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, at para. 305 (July 15,
1999).
319. It should be pointed out that the Tokyo Charter narrowed the definition by
omitting religious persecution. That is probably due to the fact that the draftsmen
assumed that persecutions on religious grounds had actually not been committed on a
large scale in comparing with Japanese aggression and warfare.
320. The Trial Chamber in Tadic, stated that "because the requirement of
discriminatory intent on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds for all
crimes against humanity was included in the Report of the Secretary-General and several
Security Council members stated that they interpreted Article 5 as referring to acts taken
on a discriminatory basis, the Trial Chamber adopts the requirement for all crimes
against humanity." See Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, at para. 652. This finding was
overruled in Tadic Appeal where the Appeals Chamber asserts that: "The Prosecution
was correct in submitting that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that all such crimes
against humanity require a discriminatory intent. Such an intent is an indispensable legal
ingredient of the offence only with regard to those crimes for which this is expressly
required, that is, for Article 5 (h), concerning various types of persecution." See Tadic,
Case No. IT-94-1-A, at para. 305.
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"and" in the listing of "grounds" probably represents a naked drafting
error by the U.N. Secretariat. Addressing this point the Tadic Trial Chamber
remarkably observes that "it is highly unlikely that the Statute's drafters
intended the word 'and' to require all three grounds to be present. The
Statute should therefore be read in accordance with custom whereby
each of the three grounds in and of itself is a sufficient basis of
,,321persecution.
Article 7(1)(h) of the ICC Statute adds to the specificity of "persecution"
by adding to the grounds by which such persecution is perpetrated.
Specifically, it adds the following grounds: national, cultural, gender,
"other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law," and "ethnic" grounds. This Article extends the protection
against persecution to a much wider extent,322 but it seems to exclude
acts committed against individuals within the meaning of persecution.
Various proposals nevertheless suggest that this crime covers conduct
against both individuals and groups by which emphasis is put on the
notion that groups consist of individual members.32 3 The ILC commentary
to the 1991 Draft Code refers to both individuals and groups of
individuals.324 Likewise, the 1996 Siracusa Draft includes a similar
provision in Article 20-4. Similarly, the Yugoslav Tribunal followed the
same line of reasoning. In Tadic, the Trial Chamber wrote: "what is
necessary is some form of discrimination that is intended to be and
results in an infringement of an individual's fundamental rights. 32 5
From a conceptual point of view, it is questionable whether for the
crime of persecution, the actus reus must be discriminatory, or is it
sufficient that the mens rea is discriminatory? In principle, and according to
the law of the Yugoslav Tribunal to be guilty of persecution, the accused
must have a discriminatory intent for the crime of persecution and the
act must in fact deny a fundamental right to the victim, but it is not
321. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, at para. 713; See Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T,
at para. 570, n.834; See also Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, at
para. 235 (Mar. 3, 2000).
322. Article 7(1)(h) includes various groups of people not previously afforded
protection against persecution ICC Statute, supra note 133, art. 7, at para. I at 7.
323. Boot & Hall, supra note 264, at 147.
324. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Third
Session, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at para. 150, U.N. Doc. A/46110 (1991).
325. Prosecutor v, Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, at para. 697
(May 7, 1997). In Tadic the Trial Chamber emphasized that: "the persecutory act must
be intended to cause, and result in, an infringement on an individual's enjoyment of a
basic or fundamental right." Id. at para. 715.
necessary that his act in fact be discriminatory against the group intended.
The jurisprudence of the ICTY is divided with regard to this issue. Trial
Chamber II has asserted that the acts need to result in discriminatory
consequences.326 Trial Chamber I held that it is sufficient that the intention
of the perpetrator, in undertaking the discriminatory acts, was to deny
fundamental human rights -on racial, religious, or political grounds.3
This wording indicates that, it is not relevant if the perpetrator was
mistaken and the people discriminated against did not actually qualify
under these racial, religious or political grounds.
This issue was resolved in the recent Tuta and Stela Trial Judgment.328
The Trial Chamber asserted that the discriminatory bases for persecution
must be interpreted broadly. Thus, persons who are considered by the
perpetrator to belong to the victim group due to their close affiliations or
sympathies for the victim group could fall within the discriminatory
bases. The reason asserted for this conclusion is that it is the perpetrator
who defines the victim group while the targeted victims have no influence
on the definition of their status. The Trial Chamber subsequently found
that "in such cases, a factual discrimination is given as the victims are
discriminated in fact for who or what they are on the basis of the
perception of the perpetrator.'
329
From the above citations, one can discern that under customary
international law the crime of persecution encompasses conduct against
both individuals and groups. Moreover, it is to be noted that although,
there is no definitive list of persecutory grounds in customary international
law, it is a common feature that whatever grounds are listed are
alternatives, the Prosecutor need only to prove one of the listed bases,
each of which is sufficient in and of itself to constitute a basis for
persecution. 330 Most notably, the jurisprudence of the Yugoslav Tribunal
has interpreted the scope of the enumerated discriminatory grounds of
persecution broadly. For example, groups and "non-groups" in the
former Yugoslavia-that is, "Muslims" (Kupreskic case), "non-Croat"
(Blaskic case), and "non-Serb" (Tadic case) can be the object of persecution.
Thus, a discriminatory mental state against a group negatively defined
can satisfy the "grounds" requirement under Article 5 of the Yugoslav
Statute.331
326. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, at para. 432; Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case
No. IT-98-32-T, Judgment, at para. 249 (Nov. 29, 2002).
327. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, at para. 195.
328. Prosecutor v. Naletilic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, at para 636 (Mar. 31,
2003),
329. Id.
330. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, at paras.
711-13 (May 7, 1997); See also Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, at para. 235.
331. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, at para. 195.
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2. Specific Intent or "Dolus Specialis"
It is a commonplace to state that "crimes against humanity" are crimes
requiring two components, "knowledge" and "intent." With regard to the
crime of persecution, a "particular intent" is required in addition to the
above two components. This intent is the discriminatory intent which sets
the crime of persecution apart from other crimes against humanity.
332
As the Trial Chamber of the Yugoslav Tribunal stressed in Blaskic, the
crime of persecution "obtains its specificity" from its particular,
discriminatory mens rea: "It is the specific intent to cause injury to a
human being because he belongs to a particular community or group,
rather than the means employed to achieve it, that bestows on its
individual nature and gravity: ...,333 In Staki6 the Trial Chamber opines
that the term "discriminatory intent" amounts to the requirement of a
"dolus specialis."334 The definition of the mental element in the Statute
of the ICC states that "a person has intent where: (a) in relation to
conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; (b) in relation to a
consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware
that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.135 But the words
"particular intent" that appear in the jurisprudence of the Yugoslav
Tribunal do more than simply reiterate that persecution is a crime of
intent. 336 This jurisprudence introduces a precise description of the intent,
namely "the discriminatory intent." This discriminatory intent requirement
of the crime of persecution is thus different from the general level of
intent required for other crimes against humanity, where mere knowledge of
the context of "a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population" is sufficient.
3 7
The Trial Chamber of the ICTY, in Kordic and Cerkez, set forth a
two-part test in order to determine whether the accused possessed the
requisite mens rea for the crime of persecution:
332. Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, at para. 212 (Feb. 26,
2001).
333. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, at para. 235; Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, at
para. 212.
334. Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, at para. 737 (July 31,
2003).
335. Rome Statute ofInternational Criminal Court, supra note 8, at art. 30 (2).
336. I am indebted to Prof. William A. Schabas for this observation.
337. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, at para. 244; Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, at
para. 212.
The accused must have had the specific intent to commit the underlying act
(such as murder, extermination, or torture). Then, if the act is to entail
additional, criminal, liability as a crime against humanity, the accused must also
have had the requisite mens rea for crimes against humanity, which has been
defined as knowledge of the context of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against a civilian population. With regard to the crime of persecution,
a particular intent is required, in addition to the specific intent (to commit the
act and produce its consequences) and the general intent (the objective
knowledge of the context in which the accused acted). This intent-the
discriminatory intent-is what sets the crime of persecution apart from other
Article 5 crimes against humanity. 338
The Krnojelac Trial Judgment does provide some clarity as regards
the quality or degrees of discriminatory intent required. The Judgment
states that the accused "must consciously intend to discriminate" and
that it "is not sufficient for the accused to be aware that he is in fact
acting in a way that is discriminatory. '339 Thus, the mens rea standard
required for the crime of persecution amounts to the "conscious desire"
standard for genocide.
As the above citation clearly shows, the prosecution must go beyond
establishing that the offender meant to engage in the conduct, or meant
to cause the consequence. The prosecution must also prove the requisite
mens rea for crimes against humanity.34° With regard to the crime of
persecution the offender must also be proven to have particular intent, or
dolus specialis. Where this particular intent is not established, the act
remains punishable, but not as persecution. It may be classified as crime
against humanity or it may be an ordinary crime under domestic
prosecution.
Noting the complexity of proving this, the prosecutor of the Yugoslav
Tribunal argued that it suffices to show merely that the accused had
objective knowledge that his acts fitted within widespread or systematic
attack based on discriminatory intent. 341  Rejecting the prosecution's
argument, the Trial Chamber wrote:
An adoption of the Prosecution's formulation of the requisite mens rea would
eviscerate the distinction between persecution and the other enumerated crimes
against humanity. Such an approach also would dilute the gravity of persecution as
a crime against humanity, making it difficult to reach principled decisions in
sentencing. Given the fact that the actus reus of persecution overlaps with the
actus reus of other Article 5 crimes, the sole distinction between the two lies in
the mens rea. Yet despite acknowledging the more stringent intent requirement,
the Prosecution essentially adopts the mens rea formulated by the International
Tribunal for crimes against humanity in general ("the objective knowledge that
such acts fit into a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population"),
simply tacking on the additional requirement that the accused had the objective
338. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, at paras. 211-12.
339. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, at para. 435 (emphasis added).
340. See infra Section 111(G).
341. Kordic Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, at para. 216.
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knowledge that attack was "based on political, racial or religious grounds".
This approach does not incorporate the requisite heightened mens rea that
justifies the increased gravity of criminal liability for the crime of persecution.
Rather, it simply requires that the accused have known one more thing.
342
Though some familiarity has developed with regard to the mens rea
required for the crime of persecution, the remaining aspect yet to assay
is whether a discriminatory attack is a sufficient basis from which to
infer the discriminatory intent of acts carried out within that attack, or
whether proof is required of a discriminatory intent in relation to each
specific act charged. In the Vasiljevic case, the Trial Chamber emphasised
that "the discriminatory intent must relate to the specific act charged as
persecution. It is not sufficient that the act merely occurs within an attack
which has a discriminatory aspect.' 343 In this context the Vasiljevic Trial
Chamber criticised the fact that, in other cases before the Tribunal, it
was held that "a discriminatory attack is a sufficient basis from which to
infer the discriminatory intent of acts carried out within that attack.",
344
It continued by stating:
[t]his approach may lead to the correct conclusion with respect to most of the
acts carried out within the context of a discriminatory attack, but there may be
-acts committed within the context that were committed either on discriminatory
grounds not listed in the Statute, or for purely personal reasons. Accordingly,
this approach does not necessarily allow for an accurate inference regarding
intent to be drawn with respect to all acts that occur within that context. 345
To the extent that the accused acted as a direct perpetrator in carrying
out the crime of persecution the Vasiljevic Judgment is certainly
laudable. In such cases where the accused is closely related to the actual
commission of crimes one might agree that proof is required of the fact
that the direct perpetrator acted with discriminatory intent in relation to
the specific act. However, this requirement might be problematic in cases
where the accused is considered the co-perpetrator behind the commission
of the crime of persecution together with other persons. In the Stakic
case, Dr. Milomir Stakic was considered the co-perpetrator of the crimes
together with other persons. In such context the Trial Chamber asserts:
342. Id. at para. 217.
343. Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgment, at para. 249 (Nov.
29, 2002).
344. Id. at para. 249.
345. Id.
[t]o require proof of discriminatory intent of both the Accused and the acting
individuals in relation to all the single acts committed would lead to an
unjustifiable protection of superiors and would run counter to the meaning,
spirit and purpose of the Statute .... This Trial Chamber, therefore, holds that
proof of a discriminatory attack against civilian population is a sufficient basis
to infer the discriminatory intent of an accused for the acts carried out as part of
the attack in which he participated as a (co-)perpetrator. 346
The Trial chamber continues asserting that:
In cases of indirect perpetratorship, proof is required only of the general
discriminatory intent of the indirect perpetrator in relation to the attack
committed by the direct perpetrators/actors. Even if the direct perpetrator/actor
did not act with a discriminatory intent, this, as such, does not exclude the fact
that the same act may be considered part of a discriminatory attack if only the
indirect perpetrator had the discriminatory intent.
347
All in all, the proof of specific intent or dolus specialis will remain crucial
to the Prosecution. However, although the defence can stress that the
prosecutor must prove the specific discriminatory intent of the offender, in
practice it is hard to imagine a case where an offender somehow has the
objective knowledge that his or her acts are committed in the context of a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, yet remains
ignorant of the grounds on which that attack has been launched.
V. GENERAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSION
The Nuremberg Charter was the first international instrument that
dealt specifically with "crimes against humanity" as a distinct category
of international crimes. It defined "crimes against humanity" as requiring a
nexus with other crimes over which the IMT had jurisdiction, namely
crimes against peace and war crimes. Thus, the Charter's formulation of
"crimes against humanity" can be viewed as a jurisdictional extension of
the international protection afforded to civilian populations from crimes
committed against them by those of the same nationality in connection
with war.349 It can also be viewed as an extension of the "scope of the
humanitarian law of war rather than as an autonomous source of rights
which accrued to individuals in periods of peace as well as in war."
350
The Tokyo Charter incorporated the same category of "crimes against
humanity" as stated in the Nuremberg Charter, but provides no further
346. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, at para. 742.
347. Id. at para. 743 (emphasis added).
348. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, at para. 218.
349. BASSIOUNI, supra note 15, at 559.
350. Matthew Lippman, Crimes Against Humanity, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.,
171,201 (1997).
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guidance on this offense.
351
The trend towards severing the connection between "crimes against
humanity" and armed conflict was accelerated by Control Council Law
No. 10 as well as the Genocide Convention, providing that such crimes
could be committed in periods of peace as well as war. The substantive
principles contained in the ILC Draft Code helped define key elements
of "crimes against humanity." The developments reflected in the Draft
Code include the elimination of the war nexus, a substantial extension of
the list of enumerated acts, and a requirement of widespread or systematic
attack. Most notably, although the ILC Draft Codes do not represent
binding international law, they may, nevertheless, be viewed as evidence
of "customary international law" or of "general principles of international
law" as enunciated in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice.352
The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR represent important recent
codifications of the law of "crimes against humanity., 353 Although the
definition of "crimes against humanity" provided in the ICTY Statute is
not quite as progressive as 1996 ILC Draft Code, it reflects several
major developments in the law since the Nuremberg Charter. First, it
includes rape as a specifically enumerated crime. Second, it clarifies that
discriminatory intent is required only for persecution and not for other
inhumane acts.
The ICTR Statute definition of "crimes against humanity" is more
progressive than the ICTY Statute as it eliminates the nexus requirement
between this offence and armed conflict. However, it does require that
all the enumerated crimes must be committed on discriminatory grounds.
This requirement of discriminatory intent represents a significant regression
in the development of the definition of "crimes against humanity." In
addition, this discriminatory element raises significant questions, and
subsequently is subject to two rather different interpretations. First, is it
the "attack" (understood as the widespread or systematic context of the
act in question) or the individual act itself that must be committed on
discriminatory grounds? Second, does the requirement incorporate some
additional mental element by requiring discriminatory intent on the part
of an accused?
351. It is primarily prosecuted as "crimes against peace."
352. Bassiouni & Manikas, supra note 76, at 547. See also Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat 1055, 1060 (1945).
353. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(d).
The evolutionary development of the definition of "crimes against
humanity" has been further accelerated under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.
The ICC definition may be viewed in some sense as resolving two long-
disputed aspects of the definition. First, "crimes against humanity" no
longer requires a nexus of armed conflict, whether of internal or
international character. Second, there is no requirement that the enumerated
crimes constituting "crimes against humanity" other than the crime of
persecution be committed with discriminatory intent. Although Article 7
of the ICC Statute gives cause for celebration in certain aspects, it also
adds new ambiguities. The term "attack" as defined in sub-paragraph
(2)(a) of Article 7 could bind the jurisdiction of the future court in cases
of crimes in which the conduct is single. This single act might
intentionally cause great suffering and be "of concern to the international
community as whole."
354
The "widespread or systematic attack" requirement is fundamental in
distinguishing "crimes against humanity" from domestic crimes. It is
this element that turns these crimes into attacks against humanity rather
than isolated violations of the rights of a particular individual. The
result of this requirement is a high-threshold but disjunctive test
(widespread or systematic) coupled with a low-threshold but conjunctive
test (multiple and policy). An attack need not necessarily be "widespread"
(understood as requiring large-scale activity involving a great number of
victims), but it must at least have some element of scale, affecting
multiple victims. An attack need not necessarily be "systematic" (understood
as requiring methodical organization or orchestration), but it must at
least be pursuant to or in furtherance of some sort of plan or policy of a
State organization.355
Thus, in construing the "policy" requirement, the ICC should keep in
mind that the importance of this element, as understood by the ILC and
the ICTY, is not to demonstrate systematicity, but to establish some
degree of State or organizational involvement in acts of "crimes against
humanity."
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that in order to meet the
standard of knowledge required for mens rea, it must be proved that:
the accused willingly agreed to carry out the functions he was performing; that
these functions resulted in his collaboration with the political, military or
civilian authorities defining the ideology, policy or plan at the root of the
crimes ... and lastly; that he contributed to its commission through intentional
354. See generally supra Section lII(B)(4). The author has raised the argument that
if only one of the Twin Towers in The United States of America were to have been
attacked, this act would not have fulfilled the provision of Article 7(2)(a) as long as there
is no multiple commission of acts.
355. Darryl Robinson, supra note 207 at. 63-64.
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acts or by simply refusing of his own accord to take the measures necessary to
prevent their perpetration. 
56
In addition, the perpetrator need not specifically intend to participate in
the attack, nor must he or she realize that the attack is in furtherance of a
policy.
357
Unlike the enumerated crimes constituting "crimes against humanity,"
which are also covered as war crimes, persecution is a crime unique
within the meaning of "crimes against humanity." Persecution was
recognized as a "crime against humanity" in the Nuremberg Charter, the
Tokyo Charter, CCL No. 10, and the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR.
However, none of these precedents provide a definition of this offense.
In the ICC Statute persecution refers to the intentional and severe
deprivation of fundamental rights on certain specific discriminatory
grounds. In addition, the Rome statute definition also includes persecution
on any other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible
under international law. Despite this development, the Statute of the
ICC limits the crime of persecution to any act or crimes within its
jurisdiction.
The foregoing analysis of the actus reus and mens rea of the crime of
persecution reveals the ongoing efforts by the Yugoslav Tribunal to
reshape the elements of this offense. Although there are now several
ICTY judgments that address the elements of the crime of persecutions
in some detail, it still remains a somewhat elusive offense, some element
of which will most probably be further crystallized in future cases. The
relevant international jurisprudence on the elements of the offense is still
quite limited, even if the recent Kvocka, Krnoyelac, Vasiljevic, and
Stakic Trial Judgements provide some elucidation of the law of persecution
as a crime against humanity.
The definition of persecution by the Yugoslav Tribunal is of great
significance since it allows a court to charge an accused with persecution
as a crime in itself, and not only as an auxiliary offense or an aggravating
factor. This should provide guidelines for the potential offender, Judge,
and Prosecutor, as well as for the new established International Tribunals.
356. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, at para. 257 (Mar. 3, 2000).
357. See U.N. Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Criminal Court, supra note 10, at 9.
The second paragraph of the introduction indicates that is not required that the
perpetrator knew the precise details of the policy. This passage implies that some
awareness of an underlying policy is probably required, but leaves considerable
ambiguity as to the extent of that awareness.
Nevertheless, it is still possible that the ICC will not follow the Yugoslav
Tribunal and will try to connect persecution to one of the enumerated
acts listed in Article 7 or other crimes within its jurisdiction.
The traditional elements of "crimes against humanity" are still required
and the analysis can only be made case by case. Much progress has
been made on defining the elements of "crimes against humanity;"
however, the road from the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute is
still being paved.
